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Abstract 
A CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW OF  
SOCIAL CLASS IN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY 
 
Brandon L Mouser 
 
A theoretical understanding of stratification and inequality is necessary to 
understand social phenomena in general. Unfortunately, professional sociology in the 
United States has historically promoted a limited theoretical understanding of 
stratification that tends to ignore economic realities, social structures, institutional 
mechanisms, power relations, and other important factors such as racial discrimination in 
reproducing social class. In fact, mainstream sociology has replaced class-based theories 
altogether with the concept of socio-economic status (SES) and, at the same time, all too 
often embraces problematic theories that justify inequality. This critical literature review 
of social class in American sociology attempts to: 1) provide a more comprehensive 
history of sociological theory in the United States regarding stratification and social 
class, 2) expose the sociological factors affecting these social theories and concepts, and 
3) deconstruct and critique mainstream social theories that offer weak explanations of 
stratification. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Class matters. Stratification, or structured inequality and the resulting categories 
of social class, is a central feature of American society; it lies at the heart of our culture, 
economy, and everyday life (Schwalbe 2008: 4). Depending on one’s perspective, it is 
either a divine blessing or a hellish curse. It can grant us freedom or take it away, 
increase our chances or reduce them to nil. It even defines our neighborhoods and shapes 
our cities. A refined understanding of class is therefore necessary to understand social 
phenomena in general.  
Class also hurts. Inequality is without a doubt the primary cause of many—if not 
most—of our contemporary social problems: poverty, hunger, crime, disease, 
psychological maladies, political dysfunction, and human misery in general. Put simply, 
the ‘lower classes’ throughout the world are left to face these social problems and lead a 
lower quality of life, while the ‘upper classes’ typically remain insulated and lead a much 
higher quality of life. Thanks to unequal distributions of wealth, income, and power, a 
disproportionate amount of resources are being devoted to a small minority of people at 
the expense of the majority. This makes inequality both an analytic and a moral problem 
(Schwalbe 2008: 9). 
Current research has indicated that there is a growing gap between the upper and 
lower classes, especially in the United States: “The United States may see itself as the 
City on a Hill, but many of its citizens labor in dismal swamps” (Greenhouse 2008: xv). 
There has been a significant decline in the status and treatment of American workers over 
the past thirty years (Greenhouse 2008: 4). Since 1979, for 80 percent of workers real 
wages have only risen by one percent, despite the fact that worker productivity has 
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increased nearly 60 percent (Greenhouse 2008: 5). At the same time, the number of 
foreclosures and bankruptcies has tripled (Greenhouse 2008: 5). One-quarter of workers 
in the United States—over 33 million—now live below poverty line, earning less than ten 
dollars per hour (Greenhouse 2008: 7). Three-quarters lack health benefits or paid sick 
leave (Greenhouse 2008: 7-8). In 2005, for the first time since the Great Depression, the 
nation's personal savings rate fell below zero (Greenhouse 2008: 6).  
One would be quite naïve to conclude that this has nothing to do with social class. 
The decline of American labor is certainly not a product of struggling business. Corporate 
profits actually increased 13 percent between 2001 and 2007 (Greenhouse 2008: 9). 
While income for the middle and lower classes has steadily deteriorated, income for the 
upper class increased 80 percent, with the top one-fifth now receiving well over half of 
all after-tax income (Greenhouse 2008: 40). Income for the top one-percent increased 
nearly 228 percent (Greenhouse 2008: 40). The average CEO today earns more than 369 
times as much as the average worker (Greenhouse 2008: 41).  
In the words of Warren Buffet: “There’s class warfare, all right, but it’s my class, 
the rich class, that’s making war, and we’re winning” (Greenhouse 2008: 41). The 
degradation of the lower classes has been caused by a deliberate dismantling of the social 
contract which was maintained between capital and labor throughout the mid-Twentieth 
Century (Greenhouse 2008: 38). Rampant inequality is rooted in capitalism’s ever-
increasing power over politics in the United States, which has reduced the need for mass 
support, resulting in a ‘disconnect’ between profits and wages and an effort by companies 
to shift costs and risks onto their workers (Greenhouse 2008: 37-38).  
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METHOD 
The primary goal of this paper is to provide a critical literature review of the 
theoretical definitions and concepts of social class in American sociology. In doing so, I 
will not only provide the reader with an insightful history of sociology, but also a 
sociology of knowledge that analyzes the development of sociological theory in the 
United States. Sociology of knowledge is “the analysis of the sources and meanings of 
forms of knowledge in relation to the experience, institutions, traditions, practices, and 
positions of social groups and the individuals within those groups” (Goldman 1994: 266). 
In other words, it is a perspective that performs a sociological analysis of intellectuals—
in this case, it is a sociological analysis of sociologists. The reason such an analysis is 
important is because sociologists themselves are embedded in a social context, often 
unknowingly succumbing to the same social forces that other people do (Saint-Arnaud 
2009: 5-7). Like any human being, the sociologist is unconsciously prone to be misled by 
his or her own socio-psychological nature.  
Throughout history, American sociologists have been influenced by an American 
ideology, cultivated in an environment of capitalism and frontier expansion, not to 
mention evangelical Christendom, and this ideology has, more often than not, 
fundamentally skewed our understanding of stratification and social class. After all, early 
American sociologists were Americans, and therefore shaped and guided by a particular 
historical context, culture, and set of experiences. Consequently, in hindsight, we can 
discover the previous biases and errors of social theorists in hopes of avoiding them 
ourselves. In summary, besides providing the reader with an insightful history of social 
theory, this paper seeks to: 1) expose the effects ideology and various cultural biases have 
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had on social theory, 2) show that professional sociologists are often biased by their own 
particular social locations, and 3) understand how institutional mechanisms have affected 
sociological research in the United States. In doing so, again, I hope to provide a 
comprehensive history of American sociology and deconstruct mainstream theories. 
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A PROBLEMATIC DEVELOPMENT 
The history of American sociology is complex and full of difficulties. 
Sociological texts had appeared in the United States as early as 1854, but these were 
largely motivated by, and interdependent with, evangelical Christendom (Hofstadter 
1992; Ritzer 2008: 52; Saint-Arnaud 2009: 15). In its infancy, American sociology 
usually took the form of a conservative, fundamentalist reaction to the social problems 
caused by industrialization, and mainly sought to ‘cure’ the moral deficiencies of 
everyday modern life and restore the importance of tradition, community, and religious 
faith. Through Christendom, Protestant Calvinism significantly influenced our early 
theories of social class, because it proposed “wealth was a measure of divine grace” and 
this meant that class itself became “the measure of perseverance in the service of God 
amongst the English Puritans and in the Puritan sects in America” (Ossowski 1963: 50). 
Because the academic system was well-established in the United States around 
the turn of the century, sociology, at least when compared to Europe, was easily 
established as a scientific discipline here (Ritzer 2008: 53). However, in the early stages 
of the discipline European theorists such as Marx, Durkheim, and Weber were excluded 
(Ritzer 2008: 53). As it turned away from evangelical Christianity and became a 
legitimate scientific discipline, American sociology was shaped more by the Social 
Darwinism of Spencer and Sumner (Hofstadter 1992; Ritzer 2008: 53). These men 
became extremely popular in the United States because they wrote in English (and were 
therefore more accessible to American readers), but also because Social Darwinism was 
favored by bourgeois Americans because it justified their laissez-faire economics, private 
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wealth, and property rights (Hofstadter 1992). So, instead of seeking to cure social 
problems, American sociologists instead began to apologize for them.  
During this time American sociology also turned away from historical analysis in 
favor of quantitative methods and a positivistic focus on short-term changes (Ritzer 2008: 
53). With the historical realities of African American slavery, American Indian genocide, 
and class-conflicts so near, most mainstream scholars were probably reluctant to study 
American history in much detail. Of course, quantitative methods are also more 
‘scientific’ and adaptable to the needs of commerce. 
  
 
 
7 
 
EFFECTS OF AMERICAN IDEOLOGY 
One must keep in mind that the United States has always been a class-system, one 
intentionally dominated by wealthy elites. The Constitution was “drafted by fifty-five 
men who were mostly wealthy slave-owners, lawyers, merchants, bondholders, and men 
of property” in order to give the “rich and well-born” a “distinct and permanent share in 
the government” (Zinn 1990: 152). Conservatives like Madison and Hamilton 
deliberately sought to dominate the masses, thwart rebellion, and protect the wealthy 
against reforms, such as an abolition of debts, an equal distribution of property, or “any 
other improper or wicked project” (Zinn 1990: 152-153). The post-Revolutionary 
government immediately adopted Hamilton’s economic program and began giving aid to 
the rich, a practice which has continued into today (Zinn 1990: 153). Not surprisingly, 
these details are usually excluded from the history lessons we receive throughout our 
primary and secondary education. 
Political domination requires cultural domination, so the wealthy have actively 
sought to impose a pro-capitalist culture of consumerism and conformity onto American 
citizens (Ewen [1976] 2001). This “American ideology” of beliefs, values, and attitudes 
is maintained by “those in charge of our society” who dominate our ideas so that they 
will be secure in their power; “certain orthodox ideas are encouraged, financed, and 
pushed forward by the most powerful mechanisms of our culture” (Zinn 1990: 1-3). This 
cultural domination establishes what Gramsci refers to as “hegemony” (Joseph 2003: 44-
48). 
In Declarations of Independence, the historian Howard Zinn provides us with a 
detailed portrait of this imposed American ideology. First, it includes a core belief in 
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individualism and laissez-faire economics. We are systematically taught that individuals 
only have themselves to blame for their problems, that government dependency is bad for 
us, and that the best course of action is simply to “let things take their natural course 
without government interference” (Zinn 1990: 151). We consequently “leave the poor on 
their own” (Zinn 1990: 1). This also causes most Americans perceive the United States as 
being an unfettered meritocracy (Zinn 1990: 159).  
Second, American ideology causes us to see economic growth as an absolute 
good. Contrary to our insistence on a laissez-faire economy, government intervention has 
never been considered bad for the rich (Zinn 1990: 151). Most Americans don’t mind if 
the State attempts to “help the rich” by subsidizing corporations, cutting taxes, etc. (Zinn 
1990: 1). Of course, it is not very difficult to figure out where these ideas probably 
originated—the rich—nevertheless, sociologists in the United States tend to favor the 
wealthy, and usually avoid going too far in their criticisms. 
Third, American ideology is strictly opposed to communism, generating a “a 
hysterical fear that has led the United States to spy on its own citizens, to invade other 
countries, to tax the hard-earned salaries of Americans to pay for trillions of dollars of 
monstrous weapons” (Zinn 1990: 260). This is because communism and socialism are 
equated with ruthless policies and perceived as a threat to 'national security' (Zinn 1990: 
1). This paranoia has led American sociologists throughout history to routinely 
misinterpret Marx, or else outright reject Marxian theories altogether. 
Fourth, American ideology also promotes military realism, or the “glorification of 
war as heroic and ennobling” (Zinn 1990: 67-68). We see this in American foreign policy 
and the rise of a nationalistic patriotism (Bacevich 2010). Tumin (1965: 383) notes that 
 
 
9 
 
professional sociologists in the United States are mostly ambivalent to war, and that 
many even have a reputation for being pro-war. 
Fifth, American ideology has historically been influenced by racism. Zinn points 
out that a significant component of American culture, interdependent with a belief in 
American exceptionalism, is the belief that certain races of people are ‘naturally’ inferior, 
including African Americans, Jews, Arabs, and Orientals (Zinn 1990: 1). Early American 
sociologists were living in a society that systematically eradicated American Indian 
tribes, institutionalized slavery and segregation, and exploited foreign countries. We 
should remember that this was perceived to be perfectly ‘normal’ for many Americans 
during this time—and we shall see that, while all this was happening, many sociologists 
still perceived the United States to be a society of freedom and justice, and, at the same 
time that robber barons were gobbling up the economy, sociologists somehow still 
proclaimed that ‘class’ did not matter. 
Finally, in the United States, despite the fact that we were founded by 
revolutionaries, we have been led to value obedience to the law and the State. This is 
important because “the dominant ideology leaves no room for making intelligent and 
humane distinctions about the obligation to obey the law” (Zinn 1990: 107-108, 114-
115). For the sake of conformity, many citizens—including most intellectuals—are likely 
to put the status quo before reason, or at least be significantly influenced by formal 
institutions and norms. 
Zinn also notes several effects this ideology has had on our society, and on 
American intellectualism in general. First, intellectuals in the United States face “the 
problem of selection in history” in which “a certain set of values has dictated the ignoring 
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of an important historical event” (Zinn 1990: 56-58). Second, this ideology ensures a 
limited choice in public policy debates, which ultimately conserves the status quo 
because certain alternatives cannot even be discussed or considered (Zinn 1990: 2-3). 
Next, we frequently permit terrible working conditions and routinely cut government 
budgets for family care, often while, at the same time, channeling funds into corporate 
interests (Zinn 1990: 1). Finally, there exists “a great dependence on experts” because 
“we are expected to believe that great thinkers—experts—are objective, that they have no 
axes to grind and no biases, and that they make pure intellectual judgments” (Zinn 1990: 
5). As we shall see, American ideology has had such an effect on American sociologists, 
who, naïve to their own limitations, 1) have embraced selective understandings of 
history, 2) been hesitant to consider alternative theories, 3) promoted a laissez-faire 
economy, and 4) taken their own values and judgments for granted. 
 This is especially true when it comes to research focused on stratification and 
social class. The American ruling class has deliberately opposed “sharp divisions in the 
mode of perception of the social structure” in an attempt to suppress class conflict 
(Ossowski 1963: 36; 89). “The view that social class is alien to American society is based 
on the conviction that the social attitudes of the average American are formed by a 
traditional ideology—the so-called American Creed” (Ossowski 1963: 105). Against all 
evidence to the contrary, American ideology perpetuates the idea that “there are no 
distinct social classes in America” based on the following mythos: 1) socio-economic 
status is not determined by birth and the road to the highest positions is open to all; 2) 
socio-economic status is not divided or broken by any distinct barriers; 3) no definite 
privileges are attached to the various segments of the scale, nor does a permanent conflict 
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of interests exist between the higher and lower levels; 4) there is no separation or 
restriction in social interactions between strata (Ossowski 1963: 105-107). 
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EFFECTS OF SOCIAL LOCATION 
One’s position in the “classification struggle” ultimately depends on one’s social 
location (Bourdieu 1984: 483). People of different “collectivities” perceive the structure 
of their society differently, i.e. a particular social context produces a “certain milieu” of 
“concepts, images, beliefs, and evaluations that are more or less common to people of a 
certain social environment and which are reinforced in the consciousness of particular 
individuals by mutual suggestion and by the conviction that they are shared by other 
people in the same group” (Ossowski 1963: 6). Because academia is itself a social 
context—with bourgeois tendencies—scholars often overlook obvious phenomena which 
are easily observed within their scope of experience. Said phenomena are “screened by 
facts and relationships which were more characteristic of the [cultural] epoch” (Ossowski 
1963: 4). Furthermore, the social background of individual sociologists affects how they 
interpret stratification: 
 
Hidden behind the statistical relationships between educational capital or 
social origin and this or that type of knowledge or way of applying it, 
there are relationships between groups maintaining different, and even 
antagonistic, relations to culture, depending on the conditions in which 
they acquired their cultural capital and the markets in which they can 
derive the most profit from it… (Bourdieu 1984: 12) 
 
 
For example, it was Talcott Parsons who first introduced most American 
sociologists to Durkheim and Weber (Ritzer 2008: 70). Formerly an economics professor, 
Parsons dominated mainstream American sociology throughout much of the Twentieth 
Century through his position in the Harvard sociology department (Ritzer 2008: 70). He 
had a major influence on graduate students (e.g., Kingsley Davis) who would go on to 
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become notable sociologists (Ritzer 2008: 70). More than anything, he shows how 
research can be affected by social location. Parsons’ own social location produced a bias 
for certain theories and an aversion to others. He was prone to erroneous interpretations 
that reflected his own theoretical orientations, which has had negative consequences for 
American sociology (Ritzer 2008: 71). Parsons also devoted little attention to Marx, 
which resulted in Marxian theories being left out of the mainstream for decades (Ritzer 
2008: 70-71). His functionalism basically ignored the plight of the lower classes in 
American society and instead over-valued social harmony and order. 
Today, while we seldom practice such ‘grand’ theorizing, professional 
sociologists are still affected by social location. This is especially true of intellectuals 
who identify more with the upper and middle classes, remain mostly detached from the 
lower classes, and treat the poor as a ‘sample’ to be studied. American sociologists often 
practice what Nels Anderson refers to as ‘descend into the pit’ sociology, i.e. the type of 
research in which the researcher seeks to “descend into the pit, assume a role there, and 
later ascend to brush off the dust” (Anderson 1961: 26). Many have become what Mills 
([1944] 2008: 15) calls a “detached spectator,” who, lacking an adequate philosophy, 
does not realize their own institutional helplessness because, trapped in a complacent 
culture, he or she never even tries to overcome it. On the contrary, an adequate 
philosophy is one in which personal responsibility is central to ethics and politics, 
emphasizing an objective consideration of events, a realistic estimation of personal 
position in relation to objective power distribution, and constant self-evaluation (Mills 
[1944] 2008: 18).  
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EFFECTS OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 Institutional norms are also influencing theoretical understandings of stratification 
and social class in the United States. Professional sociology is arguably failing the public 
because it typically promotes a limited understanding of social stratification and 
inequality. This is because 1) social theory has been devalued within the academic-
industrial complex, 2) the profession overvalues methodology, and 3) mainstream 
sociologists are prone to pursuing narrow hypotheses and trivial topics. 
In his 1975 Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association, Lewis 
Coser argued that sociology is facing a disciplinary crisis (Coser 1975: 691). The 
profession has been designed in such a way that theory is not being rewarded (Coser 
1975: 693). Recent developments are therefore limited to “narrow, routine activities” and 
“sect-like, esoteric ruminations” which are based on weak theories and typically lack 
substance (Coser 1975: 691; Burawoy 2004: 15). One result is that there is often an 
“exclusive insistence on one particular dimension of reality and one particular mode of 
analysis” (Coser 1975: 695).  
Theory has been replaced by methodology (Coser 1975: 693). Methodological 
fetishism and an obsession with trivial topics has become the professional norm 
(Burawoy 2004: 15). The profession now rewards precise measurements—e.g., path 
analysis and regression—moreso than theory or substance (Coser 1975: 692). We have 
forgotten that measurements are a means to an end and that “if concepts and theoretical 
notions are weak, no measurement, however precise, will advance and explanatory 
science” (Coser 1975: 692). Coser called this the “fallacy of misplaced precision,” or the 
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belief that one can compensate for theoretical weakness with methodological strength 
(Coser 1975: 692-693).  
Methodology is also more efficient in the context of ‘publish or perish,’ which 
values quantity over quality (Coser 1975: 693). Our passion for social justice has been 
channeled into the pursuit of academic credentials and disciplinary techniques (Burawoy 
2004: 5). Worse still, we assume that theories and findings will just “seep back into 
society through osmosis” (Burawoy 2005: 76). 
 
One of the more unfortunate trends of contemporary social science has 
been a growing ‘cult of irrelevance,’ a set of implicit standards that 
encourages smart young scholars to write more and more about less and 
less for fewer and fewer readers. The principle of academic freedom and 
the granting of lifetime tenure are supposed to free academics to tackle 
controversial subjects or ambitious research projects, but all-too-many 
social scientists choose to devote their efforts to meaningless displays of 
methodological firepower and to attack questions that are only of interest 
to a small group of like-minded scholars…they will present their results in 
a manner designed to make it incomprehensible to even a well-educated 
educated lay-person. (Walt 2009) 
 
 
 Burawoy (2005: 77) asserts that the dispute between theory and methodology is a 
result of professional sociology experiencing cultural lag, i.e. the profession is stuck in 
the early mindset of sociologists who were trying to make a place for the discipline. 
However, since Coser’s address, professional sociology has become more conservative 
and shifted even more to the Right (Burawoy 2004: 5; Burawoy 2005: 71). This means 
that, beyond a simple cultural lag, many sociologists have a vested interest in the status 
quo. They are prone to what Coser (1975: 698) refers to as a “massive cop-out,” failing to 
undertake research that would indicate the full effects of the objective, socio-economic 
context.  
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These institutional problems have had serious consequences in terms of how we 
study stratification. On one hand, American social classes are presented as “statistical 
categories which can have only a heuristic significance” (Ossowski 1963: 104). Or, social 
classes are merely conceived to be “social groups based on a psychological bond” 
(Ossowski 1963: 104). This means that class is either measured via cross-sectional 
statistics or, more often than not, understood in a narrow context of anecdotal 
experiences. Because sociological theory has been devalued, American sociology has a 
limited understanding of stratification and social class. 
This can be seen in the various terms and concepts mainstream sociologists use to 
study stratification. When discussing misunderstandings and divergences in sociological 
terminology, we may be concerned with either terminological differences or conceptual 
differences. Terminological differences occur when two researchers are employing the 
same concept but using different terms to refer to this concept (Ossowski 1963: 162). For 
example, the terms ‘class,’ ‘stratum’ or ‘order’ can refer to the same concept. On the 
other hand, conceptual differences occur whenever the same term is used to refer to 
different concepts (Ossowski 1963: 163). Such distinctions are important to consider 
because, as we are about to see, American sociology tends to replace ‘class’ with more 
convenient terms and concepts. While this might very well be an unconscious maneuver, 
it is no coincidence, and has serious consequences for theoretical understanding of 
stratification: 
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The choice of a particular term […] may be the expression of certain 
views about reality…for the purpose of theory construction as well as for 
propaganda considerations, it is not immaterial whether we agree on a 
convention to refer to the different strata of the peasant class, or to speak 
of the different classes of the peasant stratum. Long-established 
associations have given the term ‘class’ a different value for us in theory 
construction than the term ‘stratum’…for this reason it is not only in the 
choice of concepts but in the choice of terms that we are confronted with 
the problem of concealed assumptions and views… (Ossowski 1963: 169-
171) 
 
 
Lacking an adequate philosophy and corrupted by the American ideology 
described by Zinn and Ossowski, many mainstream sociologists have also been reluctant 
to challenge the status quo or explicitly blame the rich. Social class has become what 
sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel calls ‘the elephant in the room.’ Zerubavel’s fundamental 
premise is that cognition is affected by social forces. Denial is therefore a social 
phenomenon; it is necessarily a collective endeavor that presupposes a mutual avoidance 
(Zerubavel 2006: 47). It takes place within a social context, relying on a collective 
“conspiracy of silence,” which Zerubavel defines as “a social phenomenon whereby a 
group of people tacitly agree to outwardly ignore something of which they are personally 
aware” (Zerubavel 2006: 2). The fact that class exists but is seldom discussed in the 
mainstream is therefore no accident: “Separating the relevant from the irrelevant is a 
sociomental act performed by members of particular social communities” (Zerubavel 
2006: 25). Our ‘conspiracies’ are maintained throughout everyday life via norms of 
communication, which often have an institutional basis: agenda-setting, intentional 
distraction, censorship, etc. Mills ([1944] 2008: 17-18) likewise pointed to a “universal 
deception” among intellectuals caused by both “habitual intimidations” and an increasing 
dependence on corporate funding. 
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 In order to conduct an effective sociology of knowledge that reveals this 
conspiracy of silence, it becomes necessary to return to primary sources and contrast 
them with mainstream interpretations.  
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CLASSICAL THEORIES 
While we often think of social class as a byproduct of modern society, and 
Americans like to pretend that the middle class is a product of American exceptionalism, 
the concept of class actually dates back to antiquity. For instance, we find the Greek 
philosophers discussing social class. Plato’s Republic discussed how masters depend on a 
middle class to insulate them from their servants: 
 
‘Now, imagine that a man who owns fifty or more slaves is plucked by 
some god from his community—wife, children, and all—and deposited in 
some isolated spot along with his property, especially his slaves. There are 
no other free men around to help him. Would he be afraid of his slaves 
killing him and his family? And if so, how frightened do you think he’d 
be?’ 
 
 ‘He’d be absolutely terrified, I expect,’ [Glaucon] replied. 
 
‘What he’d have to do, then, despite their being his slaves, is immediately 
get on the right side of some of them, make them extravagant promises, 
and give them their freedom, whatever misgivings he may have. In fact, 
he’d end up being dependent on the goodwill of his servants, wouldn’t 
he?’ (Pojman 1998: 218-219) 
 
 
 
 In his Politics, Aristotle wrote that “the middle class is least likely to shrink from 
rule, or to be overambitious for it; both of which are injuries to the state” because “in that 
condition of life men are most ready to follow rational principle” and “they do not, like 
the poor, covet their neighbors’ goods; nor do others covet theirs, as the poor covet the 
goods of the rich; and as they neither plot against others, nor are themselves plotted 
against, they pass through life safely” (nd). He concluded that a large middle class, 
allowing for stability and rationality, was therefore necessary for a democracy to 
function.  
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KARL MARX 
In our modern epoch, capitalism would come to embrace the idea of a middle 
class to perform the functions described by Plato and Aristotle: insulation and stability. In 
Part III of the Communist Manifesto, which has been sadly ignored or undervalued by 
academics, Karl Marx predicts this phenomenon. Marx calls this conservative socialism 
(Marx & Engels 1848: 181). “A part of the bourgeoisie is desirous of redressing social 
grievances,” writes Marx, “in order to secure the continued existence of bourgeois 
society” (Marx & Engels 1848: 181). Conservative socialism is worked out into a 
“complete system” whose goal it is to eliminate any “revolutionary and disintegrating 
elements,” maintain the “relations between capital and labour,” and convince the masses 
that the bourgeoisie exists “for the benefit of the working class” (Marx & Engels 1848: 
182). Echoing Plato and Aristotle, Marx recognizes that a middle class of social 
engineers could prolong the exploitation of the working classes.  
 Marx is one of the most influential thinkers of the modern period, and he has 
arguably had a greater impact on more people than anyone else in history (Simon 1944: 
ix). A testament to the predictive power of Marx’s sociological theories, the Communist 
Manifesto could just as well have been written last week. This is because it contains a 
wealth of theoretical concepts that are still very much relevant today: stratification, 
globalization, urbanization, economic crisis, structural mobility, etc., etc. (Eagleton 2000: 
8-9). Using these concepts—in one poetic pamphlet—Marx was able to construct a 
powerful theoretical framework that helps us to better analyze and understand capitalism: 
“the writings of Marx form some sort of immense lens which concentrates the rays 
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coming from different directions, and is sensitive both to the heritage of past generations 
and to the creative resources of modern science” (Ossowski 1963: 70). 
When reading Marx, it is important to remember (but all too often forgotten) that 
he was primarily a humanist, a materialist, and a social philosopher. It is impossible to 
comprehend Marx’s social theory without first taking these meta-theoretical tendencies 
into consideration. Marx’s early notes and writings, namely On the Jewish Question and 
the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, are very important because they provide us 
with the very foundations of Marxist thought.  
Through his materialism, Marx recognized that humans are like other animals and 
live in and through inorganic nature; in practice, this interaction with material objects is a 
direct means of life (Marx 1844: 63). However, this material “productive life” of 
individuals, i.e. nourishment and reproduction, is also by default “species-life,” because it 
is social activity that maintains the existence of the species (Marx 1844: 63). Marx writes 
that “activity and satisfaction, both in their content and mode of existence, are social, 
social activity and social satisfaction” (Marx 1844: 72). Even as hunter-gatherers, 
humans were never solitary creatures, but naturally worked together in communities. 
A “species-being” (Gattungswesen) is here defined by Marx as a higher animal 
that is related to nature as a whole, and that recognizes an ecological interdependence 
and sees itself related to the universe of material objects (Marx 1844: 63-64). In humanist 
fashion, Marx concludes that humans fall into this category: “Man is a species-being not 
only in that he practically and theoretically makes his own species as well as that of other 
things his object, but also [...] in that as a present and living species he considers himself 
to be a universal and consequently free being” (Marx 1844: 62). While the animal 
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kingdom is full of other social animals that work together to subsist, humans are social in 
a much deeper sense because our collective interaction occurs within a context of 
subjective choices and universal possibilities. Marx should therefore be seen as a 
humanist par excellence. 
The Manifesto is consequently meant to be political propaganda, not a “total 
philosophy,” (Eagleton 2011: 34). It is best understood in the context of Marx’s other 
writings, which are often more difficult for the average reader (or even intellectual) to 
understand. This fact alone has lead to countless misinterpretations and abuses. However, 
I would also blame weaknesses in Marx’s writing style for being prone to 
misinterpretation. Vacillating between poetry, philosophy, and social theory, the 
Manifesto often lacks organization and clarity. In many ways, Marx failed to provide a 
clear and concise presentation of his concepts.  
This is especially true for his concept of class: “The role of the class concept in 
Marxian doctrine is so immense that it is astonishing not to find a definition of this 
concept, which they use so constantly, anywhere in the works of either Marx or Engels” 
(Ossowski 1963: 71). Marx actually spends a lot of time discussing the various classes in 
the Manifesto and other writings, but said discussion is so spread out and piecemeal that 
most scholars fail to even detect it. The manuscript of the third volume of his magnum 
opus, Das Kapital, breaks off dramatically at the moment Marx was about to answer the 
question “What constitutes a class?” and we do not know for sure he would have written 
because he died before the manuscript was finished (Ossowski 1963: 72). Consequently, 
in trying to understand Marx’s concept of class: 1) “one might regard it as an undefined 
concept of which the meaning is explained contextually” or 2) “compare the various 
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passages in which the concept of social class is used” or simply conclude that 3) “Marx 
left the problem of producing a definition of the concept of class until much later” 
(Ossowski 1963: 71). Since the first option leads us in the direction of post-modernism 
and the third option seemingly offers little reward, I will focus on the comparative 
method of understanding Marx’s concept of class. 
Marx explicitly defines the bourgeoisie in the first two pages, describing how they 
emerged victorious from the class struggle with the feudal aristocracy, have come to 
dominate the proletariat, and manage contemporary economic affairs (Marx & Engels 
1848: 14-15). Next, he spends several pages linking the bourgeoisie to various structural 
problems. Then, in the second section the bourgeoisie is further defined by its social 
status in production, i.e. capital is a social power (Marx & Engels 1848: 23). In 
“bourgeois society” the labor of others is a means to accumulation of independent wealth, 
so the bourgeoisie are implicitly defined as the owners and managers of the economic 
system (Marx & Engels 1848: 23). This includes “other portions of the bourgeoisie, the 
landlord, the shopkeeper, the pawnbroker, etc” that essentially exploit the proletariat 
(Marx & Engels 1848: 18). In other words, Marx recognized that capitalism was not 
limited to industry and manufacturing, and that exploitation was also taking place in the 
financial and service sectors. 
It is common mistake to conclude that Marx only proposed two or three social 
classes. On the contrary, he actually devotes a lot of attention to the middle class. For 
Marx, the middle class can be divided into three categories: 1) an upper middle class 
employed by the bourgeoisie for practical purposes; 2) the petit bourgeoisie, which is a 
category of composed of entrepreneurs, unionized craftsman, independent artisans, and 
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farmers; and 3) the lower middle class, which is composed of the downgraded small 
businesses falling from the latter category, which are essentially on the brink of failure.  
The upper middle class is discussed in chapter three, which is the less appreciated 
and least read section of the Manifesto. The purpose of the upper middle class is to 
“secure the continued existence of bourgeois society” by “redressing social grievances” 
through social reforms and systematically ensuring that the lower classes remain “within 
the bounds of existing society” (Marx & Engels 1848: 31-32). Marx explicitly includes 
economists, philanthropists, various activists, and social workers in this category (Marx 
& Engels 1848: 31). In a previous section, he also mentions the role ministers, professors, 
and local officials play in serving as “a welcome scarecrow” for the state (Marx & Engels 
1848: 30). The function of the middle class is therefore to maintain hegemony through 
the ideological state apparatus (Althusser 1970). While Marx somehow does not discuss 
the role of the military, police, and penal systems in maintaining capitalist relations in the 
Manifesto, it seems evident that the repressive state apparatus also functions to maintain 
capitalism through violence, and should therefore logically fall into this class (Althusser 
1970; Marx 1869: 196-198, 204). 
The petit bourgeoisie is a “supplementary” class that tentatively remains “an 
independent section of modern society” (Marx & Engels 1848: 29). Again, it is composed 
of unionized craftsman, artisans, entrepreneurs, and independent farmers. The people 
located in this class tend to be conservative because of their desire to simply “save from 
extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class” and “roll back the wheel of 
history” by rejecting any social progress that threatens their independence (Marx & 
Engels 1848: 20). Rather than revolution, the petit bourgeoisie—properly translated as 
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the “little” bourgeoisie, not “petty”—merely seek to maintain “corporate guilds for 
manufacture” or “patriarchal relations for agriculture” and generally react only when 
these are threatened (Marx & Engels 1848: 29). Labor unions consequently fall into this 
class because Marx predicted that the development of industrial capitalism would 
increasingly lead to conflicts between “individual bourgeoisie” and their workers, 
resulting in the formation of trade unions who “club together in order to keep up the rate 
of wages” (Marx & Engels 1848: 19). So, the petit bourgeoisie ultimately helps to 
maintain the status quo by serving as a cushion for capitalism. 
In the context of capitalism, the petit bourgeoisie is always in flux, and Marx 
accurately predicted that it would decline as capital accumulated. He hints at what 
Waldinger & Lichter (2003) refer to as the “dynamic of skills polarization,” or the 
tendency for capitalism to arrange jobs into a hierarchy that is constantly being modified 
by economic forces, raising the status of high-skilled jobs while downgrading others. 
Highly-skilled jobs that serve a functional purpose are frequently being absorbed into the 
upper middle class. At the same time, relatively less-skilled jobs—those that can be 
Taylorized, or those with a surplus of workers—are downgraded in terms of status, 
prestige, wages, benefits, rights, and job security. Marx was therefore under no illusions 
about the fate of labor unions, asserting that they would be successful “only for a time” 
and acknowledged that they are “continually upset again by competition between the 
workers themselves” (Marx & Engels 1848: 19). The rest of the petit bourgeoisie will 
either accumulate enough capital to become the bourgeoisie proper, or else lose their 
independence because their enterprise cannot compete with big business (Marx & Engels 
1848: 18). So, what few artisans, entrepreneurs, and farmers still remain in capitalism are 
 
 
26 
 
either on their way up or down. To paraphrase Nietzsche, what doesn’t kill them only 
makes them stronger—and the only thing that doesn’t kill them is profits! 
Consequently, the lower middle class is really a category of failing businesses. 
The lower strata of the middle class—”the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired 
tradesman” and “the handicraftsmen and peasants”—are constantly hurled down into the 
proletariat through competition (Marx & Engels 1848: 18). This lower middle class is 
mostly populated by busted unions, starving artists, sole proprietors, dwindling family 
farms, and downgraded laborers that struggle to keep afloat, are susceptible to economic 
crisis, and could be swept away by big business at any moment. 
Next, the “proletariat” is composed of the working classes, or the “slaves of the 
bourgeois class,” who are “daily and hourly enslaved by the machine” and by the 
“overlooker” (Marx & Engels 1848: 18). This class is also in perpetual development 
because of accumulation and innovation; new methods of labor are applied, new 
technologies are developed, new populations of cheap labor are exploited, new resources 
are discovered, and new jobs are created, often in relation to those downgraded from the 
lower middle class. This is the really revolutionary class because 1) it is the largest of all 
the classes, 2) it is the most exploited and alienated, and 3) it is the most vital (in a 
practical sense) because it produces human goods. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that Marx also includes an underclass, which he 
describes as the “dangerous class” or “lumpenproletariat” (Marx & Engels 1848: 20). He 
satirically describes this class as the “social scum” that has been “thrown off by the 
lowest layers of the old society” and is essentially “passively rotting” under capitalism 
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(Marx & Engels 1848: 20). Rather than promoting exclusion, Marx hoped to unite the 
underclasses with the proletariat into a single struggle. 
There are several important themes which emerge from these passages. First, 
Marx and his followers associated the concept of class with exploitation (Ossowski 1963: 
127).  
 
Marxism is not fundamentally a theory of class structure. It is above all a 
theory of class struggle and social change. The analysis of class structure 
is intended not as the end point of the investigation, but as a starting point. 
The premise is that the structure of class relations establishes the basic 
parameters within which social struggle and change will take place. The 
purpose of studying class structure is to be able to understand the 
constraints on and possibilities of transformation. Ultimately, for Marxists, 
this means understanding the conditions for the formation of a working 
class capable of generating revolutionary socialist change. (Wright 1978: 
52-53) 
 
 
Second, contradicting Weber’s polemic versus Marx, which we shall explore in 
detail later, it is clear that Marx uses both economic and psychological criteria to define 
social classes (Ossowski 1963: 72). However, what makes Marx’s conceptualizations of 
class most powerful is that they are essentially structural: 
 
By ‘structure’ in its literal meaning we understand a spatial arrangement 
of elements, in which we regard spatial relations as being correlated with 
some system of relationships between these elements or between 
particular parts and the whole…one does not however usually apply the 
term ‘social structure’ to the structure of society in this literal, spatial 
sense…in a metaphorical sense, structure is a system of figuratively 
interpreted distances and relations of one sort or another…I therefore 
conceive of social structure as a system of human relationships, distances 
and hierarchies in both an organized and an unorganized form. (Ossowski 
1963: 9-11) 
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Keep in mind, however, that, in his Theses on Feuerbach, Marx (1845: 99) 
explicitly seeks to theoretically reunite the social with the material through human 
practice. This means that, while class certainly has a psychological component, it is 
essentially objective, or fundamentally grounded in a material reality. Another way to put 
this is that class structures—and the practices associated with these structures—generally 
determine the psychological components, because “man is not an abstract being squatting 
outside the world. Man is the world of men, the state, society” (Marx 1844: 28). 
Consciousness is not detached from matter and space. 
In summary, Marxists define class as “groups determined by their place in the 
social process of production” and “at the same time as elements in a system of opposites” 
(Ossowski 1963: 54; Perrucci & Wysong 2008: 7). Wright (1978: 2-3) contends that the 
three basic elements of Marxian class analysis are: 1) classes are defined in relational 
terms rather than gradational terms; 2) these relations are analyzed in terms of the social 
organization of the economy rather than forms of technology; 3) class relations are 
primarily defined according to economic production rather than economic exchange. 
Marx did not define class in terms of “style, status, income, accent, occupation, or 
whether you have ducks or Degas on the wall…it is a question of where you stand within 
a particular mode of production” (Eagleton 2011: 160-161). Rather, Marxian classes are 
generically defined as “common positions within the [structured] social relations of 
[economic] production” (Wright 1978: 3). 
Marx’s greatest blunder was his assumption that capitalism would continue to 
simplify class antagonisms (Marx & Engels 1848: 15). This is most likely due to the fact 
that, writing at the peak of the Enlightenment, he could not have predicted the second 
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technical revolution, the rise of nationalism, or modern techniques of central planning 
and programming (Ossowski 1963: 2-3). Nationalism has since caused the formation of 
massive societies with heterogeneous populations that are centrally-controlled through 
powerful military forces and bureaucracies. The scale and diversity of these societies 
have made it more difficult to unite the working classes (Brodkin 2000, Brown 1998; 
Bonacich 1972; Waldinger & Lichter 2003; Zeitlin & Weyher 2001). It is no wonder that, 
in his reinterpretation of Marx, Gramsci asserted that social classes are not to be 
conceived of as “homogenous blocs,” but determined by a range of social factors, often 
leading to various fractions and strata within a particular class (Joseph 2003: 51). 
Imperialism, patterns of migration, ethnic antagonism, and even structural mobility have 
undoubtedly slowed the formation of a unified, class conscious proletariat.  
However, it is a grave error to interpret Marx as a simple determinist and, besides 
acknowledging the regressive influence of conservative socialism, he asserts that the 
structural development of a society can also retard the development of a revolutionary, 
class-conscious proletariat: 
 
 
The republic signifies in general only the political form of the 
revolutionizing of bourgeois society and not its conservative form of life, 
as, for example, in the United States of North America, where, though 
classes already exist, they have not yet become fixed, but continually 
change and interchange their component elements in constant flux, where 
the modern means of production, instead of coinciding with a stagnant 
surplus population, rather compensate for the relative deficiency of heads 
and hands, and where, finally, the feverish, youthful movement of material 
production, which has to make a new world of its own, has left neither 
time nor opportunity for abolishing the old spirit world. (Marx 1869: 195) 
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Furthermore, Marx also explicitly recognizes that politics and culture can serve to 
maintain the status quo by distorting class-consciousness: 
 
“Property, family, religion, order.” Society [as-is] is saved just as often as 
the circle of its rulers contracts, as a more exclusive interest is maintained 
against a wider one. Every demand of the simplest bourgeois financial 
reform, of the most ordinary liberalism, of the most formal republicanism, 
of the most shallow democracy, is simultaneously castigated as an 
“attempt on society” and stigmatised as “socialism.” (Marx 1869: 195) 
 
 
The inherent problem with capitalism is in fact what makes it so powerful: for the 
sake of a few wealthy individuals who wish to maintain the feudal relations between 
capital and labor, it deliberately denies the fact of species-being and instead promotes an 
ideology of hyper-individualism (McKibben 2008). This allows those few wealthy 
individuals to effectively exploit the species-being of humanity, but it ultimately degrades 
the human species in many ways. This is indicated by the ailing health of the system 
itself (McKibben 2008) and the numerous social problems sociologists are obliged to 
detect. 
Capitalism makes the productive life, the species-being, loathsome for the 
majority. “Under the presupposition of private property,” writes Marx, “my individuality 
is externalized to the point where I hate this activity and where it is a torment for me…a 
forced activity, imposed upon me only by external and accidental necessity and not by an 
internal and determined necessity” (Marx 1844: 53). Capitalism alienates the individual 
worker from his labor by externalizing it, and, in doing, so alienates him (or her) from 
free conscious activity, will, and nature as a whole (Marx 1844: 63). Work is no longer a 
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free and spontaneous activity, but a socially-controlled, oppressive exploitation of the 
individual. 
 Finally, there is a contradiction inherent in capitalism—this is why Marx used 
dialectics to describe it—in that there are two opposing truths within the system (Ollman 
2003). First, capitalism is fundamentally pro-social because it causes centralization, 
interdependence, and organic solidarity, making work more collective. This means that 
capitalism actually enhances species-being in many ways. However, capitalism is, at the 
same time, anti-social because it degrades society. It denies species-being while, at the 
same time, relying on it: alienating workers, promoting competition and hyper-
individualism, and making destructive decisions based on that individual greed. In other 
words, it causes the very pre-conditions of socialism, while actively seeking to suppress 
socialism through political economy. 
 The sociological concepts of Western Europe and the United States clash with the 
Marxist method of interpreting phenomena (Ossowski 1963: viii). Marx has also been 
misinterpreted by many scholars because of his connection to Hegel (Ollman 2003). 
Scholars like Karl Popper (1957) have even argued that Marx was not a ‘scientist.’ Then 
there are those who argue that Marx’s prediction simply ‘failed,’ that capitalism won the 
battle because it is somehow superior to communism (Fukuyama 1989). Early American 
sociologists, tending to be politically moderate to conservative, regarded Marxist thought 
as an attack on their society (Ritzer 2008: 36). Marxist thought therefore presented an 
immediate dilemma for bourgeois academicians, and much of classical social theory can 
be seen as an attempt to reinterpret or refute Marx’s theories in order to conserve the 
status quo.  
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EMILE DURKHEIM 
As the history or sociology developed in the United States, Parsons’ conservative 
interpretation led most American sociologists to believe that Durkheim’s sociology 
represents a clean-cut, histrionic break with Marxist thought, and that structural-
functionalism is the antithesis of conflict theory. Unfortunately, Durkheim did not intend 
for this to happen. While his sociology indicates a divergence from Marx, and Durkheim 
himself could be characterized as a moderate, his thought does not point to such a break 
with Marxist theory. A deeper investigation into both Durkheim the man and Durkheim’s 
proposed solutions to social problems makes this mainstream interpretation very 
problematic. Durkheim was not a Right-wing conservative: for him, the State, family, and 
religious organizations cannot provide the necessary connective tissue in modern society 
(Gouldner 1962: 18). 
According to Gouldner (1962: 20, 29), Durkheim was instead seeking to combine 
the Comteian focus on regulating moral norms with the Marxist focus on economic 
institutions, a synthesis of Marx and Comte which lead him back to Saint-Simone. 
Durkheim actually had a great respect for Marx. He proclaimed that Marx’s Das Kapital 
remains socialism’s “strongest work—the most systematic, the richest in ideas—that this 
school has produced” (Durkheim [1896] 1962: 41). In fact, many of Durkheim’s students 
were converted to Marxism (Mauss [1928] 1962: 34). He was friends with many Marxists 
and even wrote a book entitled Le Socialisme, which was a thorough study of socialist 
thought. While there is a turn away from many of Marx’s ideas in Durkheim, it is clear 
that there is definitely not an absolute break here, and that introductory textbooks are 
wrong to juxtapose Marx and Durkheim as intellectual opposites. 
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That said, Durkheim’s divergence from Marx is worth exploring, and it is really 
necessary to understand his disagreements with Marxism when trying to understand 
Durkheim’s theory. First, in a philosophical sense, Durkheim was strictly a rationalist 
who embraced the Western tradition of a priori reasoning, scholastic logic, and dualistic 
metaphysics. It is clear that Durkheim consequently disputed the central logic of Marx, 
i.e. dialectics, materialism, and the Hegelian view of history (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 16-
17; Stedman Jones 2001: 120). Second, he felt that Marxism, as he understood it, focused 
too much on externals and failed to examine subjective motivations (Stedman Jones 
2001: 122). Third, one needs to realize that he was an idealist who didn’t think 
sociological empiricism could be reduced to an objective, material monism. In this sense, 
Durkheim is somewhat pluralistic and could be viewed as a precursor to later post-
modern thought. Fourth, one might say that he is best characterized as the passive villain 
in Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach. His notion of science is an aristocratic contemplation: a 
“consciousness raised to the acme of clarity” that transcends the “vulgar level” and is 
accessible only to the elite (Durkheim [1893] 1984:14). This elitism made Durkheim 
uncomfortable with the lower classes. Unlike Marx, Durkheim wants to make room for 
the aristocracy and did not think the working classes are capable of existing on their own. 
He opposes the reduction of socialism to a “workers' question” (Stedman Jones 2001: 
122-123). 
Finally, Durkheim was opposed to all wars of class or nation, and was 
uncommitted and reluctant to adhere to socialism because of its violent nature, working 
class themes, and political tone (Mauss [1928] 1962: 34). In fact, his major disagreement 
with Marxism was that he did not see class conflict or violence as a route to social 
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transformation (Stedman Jones 2001: 122-123). For Durkheim, “conflict is not the 
essence of the social system; rather, it exists as a problem for social cohesion that must be 
resolved through greater social and moral regulation” (Joseph 2004: 78). Contrary to 
Marxism, class conflict is simply an indication of a dysfunction within the social 
organism: “Durkheim sees as pathological some of the central aspects of modern 
society…feelings of alienation, and even social conflict” (Joseph 2004: 69). Violence can 
never be a solution to inequality for Durkheim because it is merely a symptom of the 
disease. 
He believed that industrialization—in an objective sense—is neutral and benign. 
Civilization, and the services provided by the division of labor, completely lacks a “moral 
character” (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 12). Consequently, the crisis of capitalism is not 
economic for Durkheim (Joseph 2004: 78). Conflict is not caused by the division of labor, 
as Marxists might claim, but because dramatic economic expansion has outpaced moral 
regulation (Joseph 2004: 78). The working classes are not opposed to capitalism because 
of inequality or injustice; on the contrary, Durkheim posits that they are opposed to 
capitalism because capitalist society is simply experiencing cultural lag: “Whereas Marx 
saw the conflict of the industrial order as due to the inherent evil of capitalism, and 
Weber saw it arising from the excess of modernity’s rational order, Durkheim understood 
conflict as a failure of the social to hold the moral bond in place” (Lemert 2007: 79). The 
division of labor has increased dramatically, making us more dependent on one another, 
but we lack the necessary moral regulation to handle such progress.  
This trend towards a complex division of labor is, for Durkheim, the new source 
of social solidarity in the modern era (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 17). He writes that “great 
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political societies also cannot sustain their equilibrium save by the specialization of tasks; 
and that the division of labor is the source—if not the sole, at least the main one—of 
social solidarity” (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 23). The development of large-scale societies 
requires that human beings be increasingly dependent on society—a form of helplessness 
akin to that described in Engels’ The Condition of the Working Class in England—so that 
society becomes cohesive and integrated. Mutual dependence is therefore actually praised 
by Durkheim for maintaining peace, order, and solidarity. 
 Durkheim also sought to justify and defend private property. 'Real rights,' i.e. the 
right to private property, is not the right to material possessions according to his theory, 
but instead it is reinterpreted as the rights that define social relationships. Property rights 
form a definite system whose function is not to link together the different parts of society, 
but to detach them from one another and clearly mark the barriers separating them, 
comparable to “a huge constellation in which each star moves in its orbit without 
disturbing the motion of neighboring stars” (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 72-75). However, 
while property rights are expressions of negative solidarity, they also presume a social 
harmony because they rely on order—they define how people integrate society with 
‘things.’ Durkheim essentially ignores the fact that property rights promote inequality and 
instead, much like an economist, argues that they are necessary rules that keep the 
machine well-oiled. 
Therefore, when class conflict does occur, for Durkheim it is always pathological. 
Class conflict occurs because “at certain points of the organism certain social functions 
are not adjusted to one another” (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 292). It is never because the 
system as a whole is dysfunctional; rather, it is because parts of the system are 
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dysfunctional. He asserts that the division of labor produces conflict whenever and 
wherever there is anomie, or when the division of labor takes on an “abnormal form” that 
deviates from the “natural course” (Durkheim [1893] 1984:291). He discusses three types 
of abnormal forms: 1) anomic, 2) forced, and 3) overspecialized.  
Durkheim’s anomic division of labor often occurs because of hyper-
individualism. The division of labor itself can exert a “dissolving influence” because “the 
individual, bent low over his task, will isolate himself and his own special activity” 
(Durkheim [1893] 1984: 294). On the contrary, Durkheim’s ideal division of labor 
involves a collective consciousness, so that: “the worker, far from being bent over his 
task, does not lose sight of those cooperating with him, but acts upon them and is acted 
upon by them” (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 303-304). In theory, this allows the worker to 
recognize that his labor is “tending in a certain direction, towards a goal that he can 
conceive of more or less distinctly” and “he feels that he is of some use…he knows his 
activity has a meaning” (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 303-304). When this ‘feeling’ of 
integration, meaningfulness, and usefulness disappear—remember that, for Durkheim, 
this void is not so much because of actual working conditions, but because an imposed 
‘morality’ is lacking—the individual laborer experiences anomie. Thus, the division of 
labor itself tends to cause anti-social behavior. 
Next, a forced division of labor occurs when a society is organized into castes of 
classes (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 310). Durkheim argues that the division of labor only 
produces solidarity to the degree that it is spontaneous (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 312). 
Only a perfect meritocracy can avoid class conflict (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 311). This is 
because there is a “larger gap between hereditary tendencies of the individual and the 
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social function he will fulfill” (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 310). Furthermore, “the field is 
open to trial and error and discussion, as well as being open to the free play of a host of 
causes that may make the individual nature deviate from its normal path, thus creating a 
pathological state” (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 310). Thus, Durkheim is comparable to 
Giddens or Bourdieu in the sense that he recognizes that real behaviors are under-
determined by social forces; however, what is more important here is that he is promoting 
a utopian laissez-faire economy, free from corruption from the top or bottom. 
Meritocracy is necessary because individuals will inevitably conflict with class 
boundaries. 
Finally, Durkheim provides a third abnormal form that occurs when “functions 
are distributed in such a way that they fail to afford sufficient scope for individual 
activity” (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 323). Durkheim indeed recognizes the negative 
consequences of Taylorization, arguing that each occupation should grant the individual 
an adequate degree of autonomy, responsibility, etc. Of course, the problem with this 
notion, like much of his theory, is that Durkheim again and again fails to comprehend the 
nature of lower class labor—in his utopian fantasy, capitalism is going to bend over 
backwards to provide individuals with human rights and aesthetic considerations. 
While it is wrong to assume that Durkheim attempted some historical or 
ideological disconnect with Marx, it would be correct to conclude that Durkheim’s 
sociology was an attempt to avoid the “workers' question” (Stedman Jones 2001:122-
123). His turn from politics to morality reflects this. There is little connection between 
theory and practice in Durkheim, and, above else all, he desired a life of passive, 
armchair scholarship. He was inclined to think that societies could resolve the debilitating 
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effects of social conflict (Lemert 2007: 78). He was confident that sociology could help 
society discover a social ethic suitable to the needs of society (Lemert 2007: 79). His 
sociology is therefore best characterized as extremely optimistic—an optimism that has 
since been exposed as naïve—and he was idealistic in hypothesizing that social classes 
would ‘naturally’ give way to a functional harmony. Durkheim’s sociological theory was 
ultimately an attempt to strip sociology of its revolutionary tendencies, and while he did 
not reject Marx completely, his work certainly helped to transform the discipline into a 
more bourgeois, aristocratic profession. 
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MAX WEBER 
While Durkheim was the French antidote to Marx, Max Weber was the German 
solution. Lemert (2007: 61) characterizes Weber as “the personification of the German 
scientific scholar in a day when Germany set the standard for scientific work” (Lemert 
2007: 61). When he was writing, the German university was regarded as an ‘elite’ 
institution by scholars throughout the world. German academics had a major influence on 
the American university throughout the late 19th and early Twentieth Century (Damrosch 
1995; Mitchell 1997; Ortega y Gasset 1944). Furthermore, whereas Marx would not have 
a positive effect on American sociology until the 1960’s, Weber was introduced to a large 
American audience by Parsons, becoming highly influential by the late 1930’s (Ritzer 
2008: 36). Weber’s theories were likely accepted by the mainstream because he was 
politically moderate and did not propose radical solutions to social problems (Ritzer 
2008: 35-36). He also wrote in a more academic tone, which made him more attractive to 
academic audiences because he sounded more ‘scientific’ (Ritzer 2008: 36). Together, 
these factors led to Weber having a significant sway over sociology in the United States. 
Soon after becoming a lawyer, Weber began teaching at the University of Berlin, 
and his interests shifted more to economics, history, and sociology (Ritzer 2008: 32-33). 
Putting his father’s alcoholism and indulgent lifestyle behind him, as a scholar Weber 
came to imitate the Calvinism his mother, becoming a strict, compulsive worker (Ritzer 
2008: 33). This compulsion inevitably led to a nervous breakdown, with Weber spending 
about seven years in near-total collapse (Ritzer 2008: 33). It is worth noting that he wrote 
and published all his sociological works after recovering from mental illness in 1904 
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(Ritzer 2008: 33). However, he continued to be plagued by psychological problems until 
his death in 1920 (Ritzer 2008: 33).  
Owing to his father’s power and prestige, his intellect developed within the 
context of the German power elite, and he had little to no direct experience with the 
working classes. Consequently, Weber strongly identified himself with the German 
bourgeoisie (Joseph 2004: 98). Much like Durkheim, he was not concerned with the vices 
of the factory system and appreciated the benefits of the new industrial order (Lemert 
2007: 63-64). On the contrary, he was more concerned with discrediting revolutionary 
socialism. Marx’s theories were well known by the time Weber published his doctoral 
thesis (Lemert 2007: 61). Early German sociologists like Weber can be seen as 
developing in opposition to Marx (Ritzer 2008: 30). However, it is also worth noting that 
much of Marx’s work was not published until after Weber’s death (Ritzer 2008: 31). This 
means that Weber was not intimately familiar with Marx’s work in its entirety (as we 
know it today) and was instead reacting to the work of early Marxists, who preached an 
overly simplistic economic determinism (Ritzer 2008: 31). Weber believed he was 
intimately familiar with Marx, though. His goal was to ‘turn Marx on his head’ in the 
same way that Marx had inverted the Hegelian dialectic (Ritzer 2008: 31). This was 
supposedly achieved by placing emphasis on culture and ideas in determining social 
phenomenon and de-emphasizing the objective material world; which, in many ways, is a 
return to Hegelian idealism. 
For Weber, it was culture that determines social structures and material 
conditions, not vice versa. Whereas Marx argued that ideas, attitudes, and values are 
shaped by social conditions, Weber asserts that social conditions can be effected by ideas 
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and attitudes, e.g. religious ethics (Joseph 2004: 104). He claimed that Marx failed to 
account for capitalists as “individuals looking for meaning” (Lemert 2007: 69). He 
believed that capitalism was born from, and maintained by, an “ascetic attitude towards 
disciplined work in this world…the practical and subjective ethic of this-worldly 
rationality that drove the structure’s entrepreneurs” (Lemert 2007: 67).  
 While Weber did not reject materialism completely, he was an idealist (Lemert 
2007: 65). We see this in his obsession with rationalism. He saw ‘reason’ everywhere he 
looked; the world for him, both social and material, operated on the basis of rationality. 
“Rationalization,” defined as a general process in which instrumental means-ends 
calculations are embedded into bureaucracies, is the main historical driving force in 
Weber’s theory (Joseph 2004: 103). In theory, this is due to the fact that, through the 
imposition of hierarchical structure, bureaucracy leads to greater stability, efficiency, and 
technical superiority (Joseph 2004: 109-110). Ironically, it was rationality that Weber 
despised—comparable to Heidegger, Weber concluded that rationalization was slowly 
enframing the entire world. In a Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment, rationalization 
is cast as a negative force because bureaucracy eliminates personal, irrational, and 
emotional elements (Joseph 2004: 110). Therefore, Weber believed that modernity 
threatened the human spirit, a fatalistic departure from a previous age of “beautiful 
humanity” (Lemert 2007: 64, 66). He was opposed to social democracy precisely because 
it requires bureaucracies to function (Joseph 2004: 111).  
 Joseph (2004: 94) summarizes Weber’s concept of politics as “independent 
leadership in action.” Social cohesion and consent rests on the exercise of power, or the 
carrying out of one’s will against all resistance, and is maintained through the coercive 
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threat of violence (Joseph 2004: 99). Consequently, leadership is a major theme in his 
sociological theories (Joseph 2004: 94). He devoted much attention to analyzing power, 
not so much to critique power relations, but to understand the causes of heroism. The 
solution to social problems is to cultivate dynamic and charismatic aristocrats who could 
dominate the masses (Joseph 2004: 99). Weber concluded that charismatic leadership is 
the only force that can stop bureaucratization, and that democratic institutions ought to be 
seen as a testing ground for selecting charismatic leaders, who could passionately oppose 
legal-rational society (Joseph 2004: 98). Charismatic leadership is based on the 
extraordinary qualities and powers of the elite individual, which produces psychological 
reactions from followers—i.e., hero worship, loyalty, and devotion—unbounded by rules, 
so that charismatic authority is not founded on tradition, formal codes, or democratic 
participation, but on emotional interactions, reputation, and creative acts (Joseph 2004: 
94-95). This is one way Weber justified the bourgeoisie. He argues that capitalism is 
driven by entrepreneurial agents who are rational, charismatic individuals that tend to 
oppose bureaucratic oppression (Joseph 2004: 102).  
While Weber agrees that the economic order is important, he detaches the social 
from the economic. For Weber, a society is divided up into distinct arenas of social 
action, or ‘orders.’ The social order is defined as the “mode of distribution” of status 
among groups within a society (Weber [1917] 2004: 182). This is differentiated from the 
legal order and the economic order, which refer to different “modes” (Weber [1917] 
2004: 182). While he acknowledges that all three are interdependent, his theory is built 
around the idea that social phenomena are a world apart from economics and politics. It is 
actually a gross misinterpretation to suggest that Weber’s concept of “class” is multi-
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dimensional and incorporates economics, politics, and culture. On the contrary, “class” 
refers to the economic dimension, “status” refers to the social dimension, and “party” 
refers to the political dimension (Weber [1917] 2004: 193).  
A Weberian “class” refers to a population of people who are in the same “class 
situation,” or a “typical probability” for gaining a social position and finding inner 
satisfactions (Weber [1917] 2004: 176). This probability is derived from the individuals’ 
skills and control of resources, i.e. individuals within the same class all theoretically have 
the same range of skills and powers (Weber [1917] 2004: 176). According to Weber, this 
commonality also means that individuals within a class situation all have similar interests 
(Weber [1917] 2004: 176). Today, we refer to this as an individual’s ‘life chances.’ 
Weber distinguishes between several ideal types of classes. First, “property 
classes” vary according to the amount of accumulated wealth (Weber [1917] 2004: 176-
177). Weber, taking a stab at Marx, asserts that this form of stratification is not 
“dynamic” and that inequality does not necessitate conflict, oppression, or struggle 
(Weber [1917] 2004: 177). “Rentiers” can theoretically coexist with “peasants,” and—
taking another stab at Marx—when conflict does occur it can seek wealth redistribution 
within an economic order instead of changing the economic order itself (Weber [1917] 
2004: 177). Second, “commercial classes” vary according to economic influence, i.e. 
individual levels of “qualifications,” “entrepreneurial management” abilities, and 
“influence on the economic policy” of various political organizations (Weber [1917] 
2004: 178). Third, “social classes” vary according to identity, i.e. “class-conscious 
organization” (Weber [1917] 2004: 179). This form of stratification occurs whenever 
there is an “immediate economic opponent,” large numbers of people find themselves in 
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the same class situation, work is concentrated into a “community,” or when workers 
become influenced by “intelligentsia” who impose “readily understood goals” upon them 
(Weber [1917] 2004: 179). It is worth mentioning here that Weber’s presentation of 
“social class” is a near-perfect distillation of Marx’s concepts that were presented in the 
Communist Manifesto, so it is probably safe to assume that this type of class is where 
Weber and Marx converge. In general, “classes” are “bases of communal action” that 
occur whenever a population has a specific causal factor influencing their economic life 
(Weber [1917] 2004: 183). They are the product of economic “interests” that are imposed 
onto the “market,” or economic structure (Weber [1917] 2004: 184). A “uniform class 
situation” occurs when work becomes automated and “completely unskilled and 
propertyless persons are dependent on regular employment” (Weber [1917] 2004: 176, 
179). Intellectuals like Marx can then seize this opportunity to program the uniform class 
with ideas, thereby inducing class conflict. 
 Weber then makes it clear that “status” is something supposedly independent of 
class situation; while it is possible for class situation to determine status, and status can 
determine class situation, Weber asserts that they are mutually exclusive (Weber [1917] 
2004: 180-181). The concept of status is actually itself uni-dimensional in that it only 
refers to the social order. It is something independent of economic location and not 
reducible to social class; rather, it is based more on estimations of honor, prestige, 
ethnicity, and social background (Joseph 2004: 107). In theory, two individuals could be 
in the same social class but have different statuses. These privileges are manifested—in 
practice—through marriage, commensality, modes of acquisition, and other traditions 
(Weber [1917] 2004: 180). To his credit, Weber did see a relationship between social 
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status and economic class, admitting that “the possibility of maintaining the lifestyle of a 
status group is usually conditional on economics” and “in practice, status differentiation 
goes together with monopolization of cultural and material goods and opportunities” 
(Weber [1917] 2004: 190). However, the theoretical detachment of status and class 
categories allowed Weber to further separate culture from economics, promote an under-
socialized portrait of human agency, and adapt his theory to a Germany that remained 
somewhere in between feudalism and capitalism. 
 Finally, a “party” is an organized association within a “group body” designed to 
secure power for its leaders in order to attain ideal or material advantages for its active 
members (Weber [1917] 2004: 195). Weber saw the political party as something 
seriously flawed because they succumb to rationalization; however, he recognized that, 
except for charismatic leaders, politics commonly operated at the group-level.  
 Weber studied stratification through “ideal types,” which are essentially analytic 
concepts, or abstract mental constructs geared toward clarity, designed to represent one 
side of a causal chain (Joseph 2004: 94). This allowed Weber to generalize social 
phenomena. For example, he could transform Protestantism from a complex, historical 
phenomenon into a simpler, abstract concept to be analyzed. This is probably Weber’s 
most significant contribution to contemporary American sociology. To be fair, there is 
something to be said for clarity; however, for someone who promoted scientific 
sociology, Weber mostly studied social phenomenon mainly via historical analysis, 
philosophical interpretations, and a priori reasoning. This speculative armchair 
scholarship fundamentally weakens his theories. For example, contemporary research has 
falsified his theory that the Protestant ethic is related to the proliferation of capitalism 
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(Sanderson et al. 2011). While the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism somehow 
remains popular in mainstream sociology, it has been reduced to a “beloved myth” 
(Sanderson et al. 2011). Many contemporary theorists have found his theories of 
bureaucracy and rationalization to be flawed (Handel 2003). The truth is that Weber was 
not that great of a researcher. In the midst of promoting his shallow and biased 
interpretations of history, he lacked a strong scientific method, and what data he did 
collect was not reliable. We should therefore be skeptical of his theories of stratification. 
Still, moreso than Marx or Durkheim, Weberian theories have ironically had a 
tremendous impact on American sociology, especially in regards to our understanding of 
social stratification. If anything, Weber helped to transform sociology into an instrument 
of capitalism. First, he advocated for strict academic specialization (Weber [1917] 2004: 
271-273). For him, analysis is devoid of personal feelings, and theory is detached from 
practice. This is because facts and values are separate projects for Weber. Second, Weber 
asserts that science should conform to the demands of the status quo (Weber [1917] 2004: 
287). Scholarship should be apolitical: the professor should be a teacher, not a leader 
(Weber [1917] 2004: 279, 282-283). He even claims that ‘science’ is unrelated to 
‘happiness’ because it does not answer how we ought to live (Weber [1917] 2004: 277). 
The goals of science are limited to: 1) techniques to control life through calculation, 2) 
establishing methods of thought, 3) clarity, and 4) deductive logic (Weber [1917] 2004: 
283-284). Anything else is unscientific and unprofessional for Weber, who was probably 
reluctant to critique German politics in a German university, anyhow. This is 
undoubtedly why sociologists today attempt to appear ‘value-free.’ In summary, here we 
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see the seeds of professional sociology being sown: apolitical corporatization that often 
lacks any hint of revolutionary thought or critical theory.  
Next, rejecting structuralism, Weberian theories tend to be less abstract, middle-
range models that place more emphasis on social action and human agency (Burris 1987: 
70). Weber’s idealism led him to adopt a new sociological method. He is characterized as 
an “interpretive sociologist” (Joseph 2004: 100). More so than objective facts, he 
believed that social relations must be analyzed in terms of actors’ subjective intentions 
and meanings (Joseph 2004: 100). In many ways this was another convenient turn away 
from Marx, who argued that theory should move from the particular to the general, and 
that social phenomena are best understood through an empirical study of objective 
reality. Weber, on the other hand, focuses on the subjective aspects of social 
phenomenon, and believes that the world is effectively understood through Verstehen.  
“Verstehen,” which translates as “understanding,” is a sociological method first 
proposed in 19th Century Germany (Lemert 2007: 69). It distinguishes “social things” 
from “natural or physical things” on the grounds that subjective meaning cannot be 
studied by objective methods; on the contrary, the sociologist must be able to subjectively 
understand the meanings of the subject through empathy (Lemert 2007: 69). This dualism 
ultimately allowed sociology to be divorced from the natural sciences, and places a 
greater emphasis on beliefs, values, and attitudes. By asserting that culture determines 
economics, Weber essentially took the empirical ground out from under the social 
sciences. 
Our preference for Weber has consequently limited our understanding of social 
class because it keeps us from thinking too big or theoretically connecting social 
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phenomena to social structure. Weber re-conceptualizes stratification according to 
occupational prestige and the ownership of material goods and skills instead of 
ownership of the means of production (Joseph 2004: 106-107; Perrucci & Wysong 2008: 
8). This likely inspired our current fascination with the concepts of human capital, 
cultural capital, and social capital (Schwalbe 2008: 10). Again, this is quite different from 
Marxist theories, which tend to place greater emphasis on the functioning of objective 
structures that limit and determine human behavior (Burris 1987: 69). Also, neo-
Weberian theories frequently omit any reference to ‘class’ in favor of ‘status,’ i.e. layered 
rankings or descriptive categories (Perrucci & Wysong 2008: 8). 
Throughout most of the Twentieth Century, the culture of academic institutions in 
the United States favored theories that justified or misconstrued inequality; i.e., theories 
that ignore social structure, explain stratification according to a meritocratic ‘status,’ or 
remain at the micro-level. American sociologists were quite happy to explain 
stratification in Weberian fashion: each ‘class’ came to be defined by a particular culture, 
or a way of life that includes both material and non-material indicators. Since, according 
to Weber’s theory, culture is the primary cause of social reality, bourgeois culture is 
viewed as morally superior and the lower classes are perceived as being culturally 
deficient.  
Cultural theories of poverty portray the lower classes as a “self-perpetuating sub-
society with a defective, unhealthy subculture” (Valentine 1968: 141). Of course, this 
suggests that individual lifestyle, personal values and attitudes, and patterns of 
consumption are better indicators of social class. One result is that the products of 
American capitalism have become “absolute indicators” of middle-class success 
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(Mooney 2008: 1-2; 20). Even progressive heroes like Barbara Ehrenreich are prone to 
defining the middle class in terms of individuals being able to have “enough for home 
ownership in a neighborhood inhabited by other members of their class; college 
educations for the children; and such enriching experiences as vacation trips, 
psychotherapy, fitness training, summer camp and the consumption of ‘culture’ in 
various forms” (Mooney 2008: 1). Unfortunately, this emphasis on individualistic 
lifestyle and culture often leads to what Mooney (2008: 143) describes as the 
“irresponsible-and-immature theory,” which, ignoring social structure and context, 
reduces the probability for individual success or failure to personal choices, self-
discipline, and delayed gratification.  
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W.E.B. DU BOIS 
Leading a direct assault against the bourgeois Social Darwinism that permeated 
early American sociology, Du Bois promoted an empiricist positivism, arguing that “the 
Negro problems are problems of human beings...they cannot be explained away by 
fantastic theories, ungrounded assumptions or metaphysical subtleties” (Saint-Arnaud 
2009: 140-141). Du Bois understood race to be a cultural, “sociohistorical construct” 
rather than a “natural, fixed, or innate category” (Saint-Arnaud 2009: 143). He 
consequently wanted sociology to focus on understanding the “spatiotemporal plurality of 
races” and “multiple cultural differences sometimes leading to racial conflict” (Saint-
Arnaud 2009: 143). Racial conflict is redefined as “a function of physical differences as 
well as the broader social environment in which they are inscribed; that is, the composite 
of demographic, economic, political, ideological, and symbolic features typical of a 
historical era” (Saint-Arnaud 2009: 143).  
 Next, Du Bois asserted that, if sociologists are to understand the social problems 
of a particular ethnic minority, they must look beyond the group and understand both “the 
physical environment of the city” and “the far mightier social environment” (Saint-
Arnaud 2009: 134). This includes a detailed analysis of the social class structure (Saint-
Arnaud 2009: 135). The Philadelphia Negro was therefore a “theoretical and analytical 
breakthrough” in its concept of class as being “the hierarchical organizing principle of the 
community” (2009: 138). Du Bois understood the concept of class to be an analytical 
tool, but also “a part of a strategy for inducing Anglo-Americans to see blacks as 
something other than a homogenous and irresponsible human mass without a respectable 
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elite to guide them” (Saint-Arnaud 2009: 142). The concept of class would hopefully 
eradicate poverty for blacks and whites. 
 Du Bois defined four classes, which he called 'grades,' calculated using the 
following variables: 1) income, 2) occupation, 3) property ownership, 4) literacy, and 5) 
lifestyle (Saint-Arnaud 2009: 135). The first 'grade' was an aristocratic class, representing 
about ten percent of the black community in Philadelphia at the time (Saint-Arnaud 2009: 
135). The second was a “respectable working class” consisting of economically and 
socially ambitious individuals who were primarily concerned with accessing “good 
careers” for themselves and their children (Saint-Arnaud 2009: 135). This accounted for 
about half the black population. Third, the “poor” class consisted of struggling workers 
who, while they could not always secure “regular employment,” at the same time resisted 
“gross immorality or crime” in favor of charity and thrift (Saint-Arnaud 2009: 135-136). 
This third 'grade' represented about thirty percent of the black population, consisting of 
immigrants, widows and “abandoned women,” orphans, and the disabled (Saint-Arnaud 
2009: 136). Finally, the bottom 'grade' is referred to by Du Bois as the “submerged 
tenth,” defined as “the lowest class of criminals, prostitutes, and loafers” (Saint-Arnaud 
2009: 136). However, like many other American sociologists during this time, Du Bois 
makes no explicit reference to Marx, and makes every attempt “not to accuse or blame 
anyone directly” (Saint-Arnaud 2009: 138).  
 Despite the fact that he was a co-founder of American sociology, and employed 
research methods that were decades ahead of his time, Du Bois has since been 
marginalized through “the dictates of a physical system of academic control and 
segregation just as discriminatory as the society in which it evolved...the product of the 
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deeply racist ethos that pervaded scientific thinking about race...integral to the normative 
core of Anglo-American sociology” (Saint-Arnaud 2009: 3-4). Facing systematic 
discrimination, black American sociologists have spent the entire Twentieth Century in a 
struggle to assert their academic equality and forge a positive identity for themselves 
(Saint-Arnaud 2009: 5). Fortunately, Du Bois was able to inspire entire generations of 
American sociologists to continue moving forward and acknowledge the relationship 
between stratification and racial discrimination. 
  
 
 
53 
 
THORSTEIN VEBLEN 
Another exceptional outlier in the history of American sociology, Veblen’s 
critique of the leisure class was a direct challenge to not only Social Darwinism, but also 
functional and cultural theories of stratification. Scholars have tried to distance Veblen 
from Marx, primarily because they mistakenly interpret The Theory of the Leisure Class 
as an analysis of consumption rather than production (Ritzer 2008: 57). His focus on 
culture and ‘conspicuous consumption’ likewise invokes Weberian theories in the hearts 
and minds of most American sociologists; however, a careful reading of Veblen reveals 
that he was actually more in line with Marxian theories. 
Veblen argues that the difference between peaceful, classless societies (i.e., 
primitive) and “the predatory phase of culture” (i.e., medieval and modern) is a “spiritual 
[or cultural] difference, not a mechanical one,” but that this cultural difference is 
essentially “an outgrowth of a change in material facts of the life of the group…the 
growth of technical knowledge and the use of tools” (Veblen [1899] 1967: 20). In other 
words, Veblen appears to be more of a Marxian materialist, stressing that the ideas are 
ultimately grounded in objective, economic reality. For him, social forces are “no doubt 
ultimately reducible to terms of living tissue and material environment” (Veblen [1899] 
1967: 189). Furthermore, similar to Marx’s concept of surplus-value, Veblen argues that 
“predation cannot become the habitual, conventional resource of any group or class until 
industrial methods have been developed to such a degree of efficiency as to leave a 
margin worth fighting for, above the subsistence of those engaged in getting a living” 
(Veblen [1899] 1967: 20-21).  
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He likewise takes a more structural approach that goes unnoticed in introductory 
textbooks. “It is as elements of social structure,” writes Veblen, “that leisure and 
ownership are matters of interest” ([1899] 1967: 22). Veblen’s first project was to trace 
the evolutionary development of social stratification. The rise of the leisure-class 
coincides with the beginning of ownership (Veblen [1899] 1967: 22). Wherever the 
institution of private property exists, there shall also exist a struggle between men for the 
possession of goods, which ultimately results in acquisition and accumulation of wealth 
(Veblen [1899] 1967: 24-25).  
In turn, the acquisition and accumulation of wealth “confers honour” to various 
individuals, resulting in a “distinction” and frequent “emulation” or “cultural advance” 
which give rise to social institutions (Veblen [1899] 1967: 26-28). Veblen argues that the 
“the distinction between exploit and drudgery is an invidious distinction between 
employments [is] habitually made [via] conditions of emulation,” which demand 
aggressive pursuits of honor and prestige (Veblen [1899] 1967: 15-16). The resulting 
upper classes increasingly employ leisure-time as a symbol of their superiority: “the rule 
holds with but slight exceptions that, whether warriors or priests, the upper classes are 
exempt from industrial employments, and this exemption is the economic expression of 
superior rank” (Veblen [1899] 1967: 1). Other symbols include “immaterial goods” that 
indicate leisure: “quasi-scholarly” and “quasi-artistic accomplishments,” or “a knowledge 
of processes and incidents which do not conduce directly to the furtherance of human 
life,” including distinct “branches” of sports and activities and “refined tastes, manners, 
and habits of life” such as décor, fashion, etc. (Veblen [1899] 1967: 45-48). 
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This is what leads to patterns of “conspicuous consumption,” i.e. the upper classes 
ritually consume products like “food, clothing, dwelling, and furniture” as symbols of 
social status (Veblen [1899] 1967: 68). Eventually, the possession of various amounts of 
wealth becomes a social necessity, i.e. “it becomes indispensable to accumulate, to 
acquire property, in order to retain one’s good name,” because once “wealth presently 
assumes the character of an independent and definitive basis of esteem” acquisition 
becomes a “meritorious act” (Veblen [1899] 1967: 29). Except for a few rare exceptions, 
“those members of the community who fall short” will “suffer in the esteem of their 
fellow men” and “also in their own esteem since the usual basis of self-respect is the 
respect accorded by one’s neighbors” (Veblen [1899] 1967: 30). 
Social classes emerge from a system of ideas and practices that arrange human 
labors into a structured hierarchy: “The institution of a leisure class is the outgrowth of an 
early discrimination between employments, according to which some employments are 
worthy and others unworthy…worthy employments are those which may be classed as 
exploit; unworthy are those necessary everyday employments into which no appreciable 
element of exploit enters” (Veblen [1899] 1967: 8). “As wealth accumulates” and 
“differentiation is furthered by wealth” the “leisure class develops further in function and 
structure, and there arises a differentiation within the class” marked by an “elaborate 
system of rank and grades” (Veblen [1899] 1967: 76). The upper classes soon require an 
insular middle-class of “henchmen and retainers” and so “uniforms, badges, and liveries 
come into vogue” (Veblen [1899] 1967: 78). 
An early conflict theorist, Veblen was attempting to show that the upper classes 
were in fact dysfunctional and culturally inferior. The leisure-class is the “conservative 
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class” (Veblen [1899] 1967: 198). It is the “least responsive” because it is not “in the full 
sense an organic part of the industrial community” and remains “sheltered from the stress 
of those economic exigencies” (Veblen [1899] 1967: 198). “The leisure class lives by the 
industrial community rather than in it,” writes Veblen ([1899] 1967: 246). In terms of 
social evolution, its social function is simply to “retard the movement and to conserve 
what is obsolescent” because it has a “vested interest, of an unworthy sort, in maintaining 
the present conditions” that ensure its existence (Veblen [1899] 1967: 198). In 
conclusion, Veblen promotes a revolutionary idea that again makes him appear to be 
more of a Marxist, arguing that the upper classes should be dismantled altogether. “As 
fast as pecuniary actions are reduced to routine,” writes Veblen, “the captains of industry 
can be dispensed with” ([1899] 1967: 211).  
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PITIRIM SOROKIN 
Moving away from Du Bois and Veblen, the 'quantitative turn' sociology took in 
the United States is embodied in Pitirim Sorokin's Social Mobility (1927: x-xi). This text 
was “the first thoroughgoing attempt to describe social mobility in terms of social 
stratification and social distance” and to assemble “in accessible form a vast amount of 
factual evidence and quantitative data” on stratification in American sociology (Chapin 
1927). To his credit, Sorokin acknowledged that it is impossible to understand social 
phenomena without an adequate understanding of social mobility (Sorokin 1927: x). “The 
biography of a man,” writes Sorokin, “in its essence is largely a description of the groups 
to which the man has had a relation, and the man's place within them” (Sorokin 1927: 6). 
Stratification expresses “something that really exists in the social universe,” including 
domination and subordination, authority and obedience, promotion and degradation 
(Sorokin 1927: 8).  
 Sorokin presents us with the concepts of “vertical mobility,” or movement up and 
down the structural hierarchy between groups, and “horizontal mobility,” which is 
movement within a particular group (Sorokin 1927: 8). Stratification is the product of 
“social selection and distribution” via various institutions and mechanisms (Sorokin 
1927: 207). Vertical mobility consequently occurs through “holes,” “staircases,” 
“elevators,” and “channels” in what he described as the “membranes” between social 
layers, including institutions such as the military, church, school, political organizations, 
professional and wealth-making organizations, and the family (Sorokin 1927: 165-181). 
Notice how these correlate with Althusser's state apparatus and his overall project: “this 
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means that any social reformer must pay the most serious attention to the problem of a 
proper reorganization of these institutions” (Sorokin 1927: 208). 
Sorokin promoted a sociological methodology in which quantitative analysis 
should be used to examine the “exterior architecture” of the social structure, i.e. to 
measure and describe how society is stratified, and then qualitative analysis should be 
used to understand the “inner structure” and mechanical organization of the “social 
pyramid” (Sorokin 1927: 17). So, in terms of his overall theory, in many ways Sorokin 
could be seen as an early structuralist—however, the quantitative aspects of his 
methodology have had much more influence on professional sociology. 
 Despite its many virtues, Social Mobility inherited a number of vices, betraying 
the influence Weberian theories have had on professional sociology in the United States. 
The irony in all of this is that Sorokin was especially opposed to Weber's interpretive 
methodology and favored a more empirical approach. For example, he rejected various 
forms of “speculative psychologizing and philosophizing,” which he referred to as the 
“plague of sociology” (Sorokin 1927: x-xi). “Speculative sociology is passing over,” 
writes Sorokin, “an objective, factual, behavioristic, and quantitative sociology is 
successfully superseding it” (Sorokin 1927: x).  
 At the same time, however, Sorokin did adopt the Weberian notion that 
sociologists ought to be 'value-free.' Another “plague” for him was the frequency of 
“'preaching or evaluative judgments' of what is good and what is bad, what is 'useful' and 
what is 'harmful,'“ which Sorokin believed compromised science (Sorokin 1927: xi). 
Sociologists studying stratification should not favor one class over another: “the task of 
evaluation is entirely out of the field of such a study” (Sorokin 1927: xi). Unfortunately, 
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like many professional sociologists, while Sorokin might have honestly believed that he 
was being 'value-free,' his analyses were in fact extremely biased.  
Sorokin was a Russian immigrant who regarded the United States as a 'City on a 
Hill.' He ends his preface expressing his gratitude to “the people of the United States of 
America” and his colleagues at Minnesota, adding “where I found the most hospitable 
shelter, the possibility of work, and the most instructive social school” (Sorokin 1927: 
xii). Like most of his contemporaries, Sorokin mistakenly believed that the Soviet Union 
accurately represented Marx's thought. In Social Mobility, socialists are caricatured as 
clever opportunists who use political activity as an avenue for social mobility: “to be a 
socialist now means to take the quickest, most comfortable, and surest way of climbing 
and getting the desired power and other worldly things” (Sorokin 1927: 489). He also 
refers to socialists and communists as “groups of levelers” who, without exception (at 
least, in his interpretation), throughout history have hypocritically became tyrants and 
oligarchs with contempt for the masses (Sorokin 1927: 16). He is clearly still debating 
with the ghost of Marx, and much of his quantitative data attempts to refute him.  
 First, Sorokin (1927: 14) attacks Marx by attempting to dispel the belief that 
primitive communism was more egalitarian, which was one of the inspirations for Marx's 
overall project. He claims that “unstratified society, with a real equality of its members, is 
a myth which has never been realized in the history of mankind,” and even occurs in the 
plant and animal kingdoms (Sorokin 1927: 12-13). Taking a stab at Marx's more 
Hegelian view of history, he also asserts that “history shows only goalless fluctuations,” 
or that no group exhibits a perpetual trend towards prosperity or impoverishment 
(Sorokin 1927: 25). Next, Sorokin understood that Marx's essential point was that 
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economic differentiation would increase as European societies evolved; however, he 
refuted the theory on the grounds that “the 75 years which have elapsed since the 
Communist Manifesto did not corroborate Marx's expectation and prophecy” and 
consequently “this part of the theory was disproved by history” (1927: 38-39). Amidst 
tycoons like Rockefeller and Morgan, Sorokin was convinced that there was no statistical 
evidence to suggest that “the rich as a class were getting rapidly richer” or indicate “the 
existence of any marked tendency of concentration of capital in fewer and fewer hands” 
(Sorokin 1927: 41). To be fair, when he was writing, the economic conditions of 
European and American laborers had been improving since World War I, with real wages 
and purchasing power steadily rising up into the 1920's, and the middle class appeared to 
be growing (Sorokin 1927: 39-40). Amidst the naive optimism of Roaring Twenties, he 
therefore (somewhat hastily) concluded that Marx's theories had been falsified. “So much 
for the theories of Marx,” writes Sorokin, “the above data are enough to show that 
practically all his predictions have failed” (Sorokin 1927: 45). Of course, within a few 
years of said publication, not to mention the past few decades, Marx's theories are much 
harder to dismiss. 
Again, Sorokin sees the world through the lens of an adopted American ideology, 
which is undoubtedly why the book was so successful in academic circles. It is made 
clear throughout that he is wholeheartedly supportive of American capitalism. The book 
begins (literally) with the less-than-value-free assertion that “Our society is a mobile 
society par excellence” (Sorokin 1927: x). Of course, the obvious problem with this 
statement is that it only applied to European Americans with white skin—Sorokin was 
not considering the oppression African Americans, Latinos, Chinese immigrants, or 
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American Indians were facing during this time period. It should also be mentioned here 
that Sorokin replaced the term “class” with “social layers” (Sorokin 1927: 11). This 
further provides evidence that, from its early years, professional sociology has been prone 
to avoid the issue of social class and depict the United States as a meritocracy devoid of 
class interests. 
 Another vice inherited from Weber is a Verstehen-inspired, metatheoretical 
dualism. Sorokin's analysis detaches social location from the physical world, i.e. “social 
space” is detached from “geometrical space” (Sorokin 1927: 3-4). Social location is 
therefore removed from economic context and instead depends more on cultural status, 
i.e. “relations to other men” or groups in the social universe (Sorokin 1927: 4-5). While 
he doesn't explicitly reject materialism—much like Weber—this dualism skews his 
analysis. His project begins by further dividing stratification into three dimensions: 
economic stratification is rooted in unequal wealth, political stratification on authority 
and prestige, and occupational stratification based on occupational-group authority and 
prestige (Sorokin 1927: 11-12). Towards the beginning of the book, Sorokin claimed that 
his social status is calculated based on the following concepts: family status, nationality, 
religious group, occupational group, political party, economic status, race, and finally the 
relative person of the individual within each of these groups (Sorokin 1927: 5). Social 
location is ultimately defined as the totality of these variables (Sorokin 1927: 6). 
However, throughout the text I could find no such grand calculation; instead, he seems to 
treat each “dimension” separately whenever he provides statistics, e.g. correlations 
between wealth and health, or between occupation and health. Much of the text is instead 
devoted to correlating social location with individual attributes, such as “general 
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intelligence, health, and social character” or more specific qualities, such as artistic 
talents (Sorokin 1927: 183).  
The aspect of Sorokin's theory that arguably had the greatest impact on 
professional sociology was his discussion occupational stratification. Sorokin asserts that 
occupational stratification occurs in two forms: “interoccupational stratification” and 
“intraoccupational stratification.” The first refers to relations between occupational 
classes when a particular occupational group is superimposed upon another, while the 
second occurs within each occupational class when members of an occupational group 
are stratified into ranks and layers (Sorokin 1927: 99). Likely the inspiration for Davis & 
Moore's mainstream essay, Sorokin (1927: 100) then argues that interoccupational 
stratification is based on two conditions: 1) the functional importance of an occupation 
for the continued existence of the group as a whole, and 2) the relative degree of 
intelligence (i.e., skills) necessary for a successful performance of a particular occupation 
(Sorokin 1927: 100-101). In terms of intraoccupational stratification, we discover 
Sorokin providing a prototype of Erik Olin Wright's new model, dividing each 
occupational group into various quantitative categories, such as “employers and 
independents,” “higher employees,” and “wage earners” (1927:117-121). However, more 
importantly, the generic concept of “occupational group” with leanings towards status-
based measurements ultimately paved the way for SES to replace class-based theories. 
 That said, Social Mobility does intentionally challenge American ideology in 
fundamental ways. This is especially true in terms of Sorokin's conclusions related to 
political stratification. Sorokin believed that history does not show a trend towards 
greater political equality, or a more equal distribution of power, but instead concluded 
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that advanced societies typically generate complex hierarchies of political authority, and 
that history is trendless in terms of politics (Sorokin 1927: 72). He also claims that there 
is no perpetual trend from monarchy to republic, from a government of the minority to 
that of the majority, or that political stratification has decreased from previous epochs 
(Sorokin 1927: 78-84). One can only wonder what idealistic Americans were thinking 
when reading this chapter in the 1920’s! Instead, political stratification increases along 
with 1) the size of the political state, 2) the heterogeneity of its population, or 3) when 
one or both of these factors increase or decrease through violent means (Sorokin 1927: 
84-85). Furthermore, despite his crusade versus Marxism, he did recognize the tension 
between accumulation and equalizing forces, and argued that “if economic inequality 
becomes too great and reaches the point of overstrain the top of society is doomed to 
crumble and fall” because “the economic cone of an advanced society fluctuates within 
definite limits” (Sorokin 1927: 63). Consequently, many of Sorokin's theories could still 
be relevant today—especially since the economic cone of ours has recently grown so top-
heavy. 
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KINGSLEY DAVIS, WILBERT MOORE, & MELVIN TUMIN 
Davis & Moore’s Some Principles of Stratification (1945) argues that 
stratification and inequality are a “universal necessity” (Davis & Moore 1945: 242). 
Drawing off the Parsonsian misinterpretation of Durkheim, social class is recast as an 
organic function, i.e. according to this view, inequality is not the result of human agency, 
domination, or conflict, but manifests ‘naturally’ by way of society’s ‘invisible hand.’ 
The central argument of Davis & Moore is that: 1) certain positions in society are 
functionally more important than others and require special skills, 2) only a limited 
number of individuals within any society possess the necessary talent to acquire these 
skills, 3) the conversion of these talents into skills requires sacrifices on the part of these 
individuals due to training, 4) in order to induce talented individuals to make these 
sacrifices and receive said training, their future positions must offer more rewards than 
they would have otherwise received, 5) these rewards consist of sustenance, comfort, 
diversions, and prestige, 6) stratification is the natural manifestation of these principles, 
and, finally, 7) social inequality is therefore positively functional and inevitable in any 
society (Tumin 1953: 388). It is consequently society itself, not the bourgeoisie, which 
must “give sufficient reward to them…to insure that they will be filled competently” 
(Davis & Moore 1945: 243). Power and interest were simply removed from the equation.  
Tumin (1953: 387) criticized Davis & Moore for being biased in their judgment 
of what is ‘functional.’ For example, the labor of factory workers is just as necessary as 
the labor of an engineer; furthermore, our ideas of what types of labor are perceived to be 
more valuable are shaped by culture, and are therefore not ‘natural’ or absolute. 
Stratification itself is dysfunctional because it often limits the discovery and recognition 
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of talented individuals (Tumin 1953: 389). The reward-structure often fails to reward 
equal amounts of income, power, and prestige (Tumin 1953: 392). Nor are those in power 
necessarily the most talented individuals, or the ones that have experienced the most 
training or sacrifice (Tumin 1953: 389-390).  
Finally, the only items which society must distribute unequally are the power and 
property necessary for the performance of the different tasks (resources) but there is no 
evidence that rewards must differ (Tumin 1953: 392-393). There are also other 
motivations (besides money) that induce men to choose a career path (Tumin 1953: 391). 
To assume that inequality is an absolute good and that rewards based on money and 
labor-time are inevitable is therefore a serious error: “Every known society, past and 
present, distributes its scarce and demanded goods and service unequally…The ubiquity 
and the antiquity of such inequality has given rise to the assumption that there must be 
something inevitable and positively functional about such social arrangements” (Tumin 
1953: 387). 
Tumin goes on to argue that Parsonsian functionalism is itself dysfunctional 
because it lacks a moral compass: 
 
The functionalist approach permits the investigator to take certain ends or 
interests or system-states as given, and to analyze the consequences—
supportive and destructive—of any given set of practices for those ends, 
interests, or system-states. In the process, one may, without apparent 
penalty, narrow one’s focus of attention so that only certain lines of 
consequence for certain actors are highlighted while others are ignored. 
(Tumin 1965: 380) 
 
 
Furthermore, functionalism claims to be ‘value-free’ but in fact it is biased by the 
institutional context, assumptions, values, and attitudes of the researcher (Tumin 1965). 
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The functionalist approach therefore skews our understanding of stratification and social 
class because it is prone to a naïve delusion: functionalists claim to be objective and 
might even believe they are, but in fact they employ a vast array of metatheoretical 
assumptions. These assumptions are often conservative products of an unchecked 
ideology, social location, and institutional factors. 
Of course, in his reply Kingsley Davis is less-than-value-free, and not exactly 
excited about Tumin’s constructive criticism. “He himself offers no explanation for the 
universality of stratified inequality,” snaps Davis (1953: 394). Davis first accuses Tumin 
of being biased, asserting that their “causal explanation” is not a “justification” (Davis 
1953: 394). Fleeing into idealism, the next counterpoint is to claim that their article 
“represented a high degree of abstraction” and that “Tumin confuses abstract, or 
theoretical, reasoning on one hand with raw empirical generalizations on the other” 
(Davis 1953: 394). Davis also hides inside of a multi-dimensional, Weberian approach, 
thereby accusing Tumin of being inconsistent and conflating concepts in his critique 
(Davis 1953: 394). Tumin has also apparently misrepresented their theory (Davis 1953: 
394). Though, after reading both articles, one would be hard pressed to conclude that 
Tumin misrepresented anything. 
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W. LLOYD WARNER 
 Perhaps one of the most influential works in the history of American sociology, at 
least in terms of how we understand social stratification, was Social Class in America, 
written and published in 1949 by Warner and his colleagues at Science Research 
Associates, Inc. Put simply, this book carried on where Sorokin had left off, providing 
professional sociologists with a methodological model for studying stratification and 
conflating social class with quantitative measurements. 
Warner actually acknowledges that the United States perpetuates a social class-
system, and that stratification is an important social phenomenon. “In the bright glow and 
warm presence of the American Dream all men are born free and equal,” he writes, 
though “we all know such perfect equality of position and opportunity does not exist” 
simply because “all Americans are not born into families of equal position” and “if all 
men are equal there can be no top level to aim for” (Warner et al. 1949: 3). He recognizes 
that “social class enters into almost every aspect of our lives” and is “an important 
determinant of personality,” “skills, abilities, and intelligence,” and patterns of 
consumption (Warner et al. 1949: v-vi). Warner also admits that class often has negative 
consequences; there are “hard facts of our social-class system” and “we only learn by 
hard experience, often damaging us, that some things we learned in early life [in school] 
exist only in our political ideals and are rarely found in the real world” (Warner et al. 
1949: v). However, despite this admission, Warner is ultimately apologetic for American 
society, and does not seek fundamental changes to the system—if anything, he seems to 
revere social class in the United States. 
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Likely influenced by Davis & Moore, Warner takes a hardcore functionalist 
perspective. He argues that social stratification is not only ‘natural,’ but an organic 
necessity. “Some form of rank is always present and a necessity for our kind of society” 
and “when societies are complex and service large populations, they always possess some 
kind of status system which...places people in higher and lower positions” (Warner et al. 
1949: 8). Warner then hints at a Parsonsian systems theory, adding that organized 
specialization, coordination, and integration is essentially what maintains society and 
“enables the larger group to survive and develop” (Warner et al. 1949: 8). He compares 
society to a “large industrial enterprise,” which necessarily requires a hierarchical 
structure of authority to function (Warner et al. 1949: 8-9). The result is that social class 
is cast as a brute fact—an absolute reality than modern man must simply cope with: 
 
Social status in America is somewhat like man's alimentary canal [i.e., 
digestive tract]; he may not like the way it works and he may want to 
forget that certain parts of it are part of him, but he knows that it is 
necessary for his very existence. So the status system, often an object of 
our disapproval, is present and necessary in our complex social world. 
(Warner et al. 1949: 10) 
 
 
 Warner therefore denounces those who reject the “American Dream” because of 
stratification and social class: “Fortunately, most of us are wiser and better adjusted to 
social reality; we recognize that, though it is a Dream and though some of it is false, by 
virtue of our firm belief in it we have made some of it true” (Warner et al. 1949: 4-5). 
Our meritocracy is ‘justified by faith.’ Warner boldly asserts that, in the United States, 
“the principles of democracy do operate,” precisely because our society maintains themes 
of meritocracy, i.e. “democratic faith,” “equal rights as citizens,” and the “Christian 
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dogma that all men are equal in the sight of God because He is our Father and we are His 
spiritual children” (Warner et al. 1949: 4). 
In Durkheimian fashion, his main concern is ensuring that this hierarchical 
structure arises ‘naturally,’ asserting that “we must work to keep it as democratic and 
equalitarian as possible” and “see to it that each American is given his chance to move in 
the social scale” (Warner et al. 1949: 10-11). This is not to be achieved through structural 
changes—e.g., political or economic reforms—but through a utopian moral order. It is 
this morality which transforms the American class-system into an exceptional way of life 
that demands our respect. Warner also claims that there are countless examples of 
Americans advancing from the bottom to the top which provide us “convincing evidence” 
that the United States is a true meritocracy (Warner et al. 1949: 4). Though, to be honest, 
he doesn’t provide us with this evidence. 
 Warner was also heavily influenced by Weberian theories. For example, he 
embraced an old-fashioned metaphysical dualism that, like so many of his 
contemporaries, skewed his analysis because it disconnected the socio-mental from the 
physical. For example, much like Weber, Warner admits that economic and technological 
factors are important determinants of stratification; however, he consistently argues that 
“class is a multi-factored phenomenon” (Warner et al. 1949: 129). For Warner, seemingly 
reading Weber through Christian dogma, human survival “universally depends” on “three 
environments” (Warner et al. 1949: 266). These are 1) the “natural environment,” 
manipulated through technology, 2) the “human species environment,” or “system of 
social organization,” which is controlled through moral order and results in “real power,” 
and 3) the “supernatural environment,” or “a system of sacred symbols,” which is 
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controlled through “rituals of religion and magic” which not only determine man’s 
“ultimate fate” but “govern those activities and outcomes over which the other two have 
insufficient power” (Warner et al. 1949: 266-267). Warner consequently asserts that 
“beliefs, values, and rules” are the primary determinants of both 1) economic and 
technological factors and 2) social complexity, the latter of which he argues is “the basic 
factor determining the presence or absence of class” (Warner et al. 1949: 9). Warner 
likewise takes a more Weberian view of power and authority, i.e. power is not reducible 
to material reality (Warner et al. 1949: 265). 
 It should come as no surprise that Warner was theoretically opposed to Marx. He 
mistakenly associated Marxism with the Soviet Union (Warner et al. 1949:  9-10). He 
explicitly rejects a Marxian analysis of stratification because 1) “the presence of class 
order does not necessarily mean class conflict—the relations of the classes can be and 
often are amiable and peaceful” and 2) “classless societies (without differential status 
systems) are impossible where there is a complexity” (Warner et al. 1949:  9-10).  
To summarize, Warner was obviously not ‘value-free.’ He was corrupted by an 
American ideology that leaned him in the direction of those classical theorists who were 
debating with the ghost of Marx. His metatheoretical perspective was a cocktail of 
Durkheimian utopianism, Parsonsian Functionalism, and Weberian underpinnings. The 
first caused him to overvalue moral regulation and see it as enough to cure the negative 
effects of social class. The second caused him to regard the United States’ class-system 
(and inequality as we know it) to be an inevitable, harmonious, organic necessity. The 
third factor, Weber, de-emphasized the economic dimension and, among other things, 
caused Warner to focus exclusively on individual action. Class was recast as an 
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individualistic dilemma, i.e. “the lives of many are destroyed because they do not 
understand the workings of social class” (Warner et al. 1949: 5). Conformity to the status 
quo, and a Weberian ‘independent politics in action,’ were Warner’s prescribed solutions: 
“To live successfully and adaptively in America,” writes Warner, “every one of us must 
adjust his life to each of these contradictions, not just one of them, and we must make the 
most of each” (Warner et al. 1949: 5). 
Social Class in America was more concerned with measuring stratification and 
less concerned with understanding it: “This book on social status is a scientific tool with 
a detailed set of directions for understanding and measuring social class and making such 
knowledge useful to all social scientists, to class analysts, and, where necessary, to those 
who deal with more practical matters” (Warner et al. 1949: vii). According to Warner 
himself, the primary purpose of the book is to provide a method for “how to identify any 
class level,” “how to study and measure it,” and “how to find the class level of an 
individual” (Warner et al. 1949: v). So, it is another historical indicator of the 
‘quantitative turn’ away from social theory and towards what Coser refers to as 
methodological fetishism and routine activities. Warner claims that “social scientists have 
been more concerned with their theories and with quarreling among themselves about 
what social class is than with studying its realities in the daily lives of people...they have 
lagged behind novelists in investigating what our classes are, how they operate in our 
social life, and what effect they have on our individual lives” (Warner et al. 1949: 6). 
Warner compares the social scientist to a geographer; in studying the status structure of a 
community “he must identify, describe, locate, interrelate, and measure the facts about 
the structure of social interaction” and then report it in the form of a “map” (Warner et al. 
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1949: 34). Of course, when profits are at stake, critical inquiry and academic debate gets 
devalued. 
Next, Warner was hoping to aid capitalism, mainly because businesses are 
“forever at the mercy of the status evaluations of their customers” who desire “powerful 
symbols of status and social class,” so the book will hopefully “greatly aid them in 
measuring and understanding the human beings who make up their markets” (Warner et 
al. 1949: vii). Understanding status can help corporations to better understand consumers 
and market their products.  
 Finally, Warner mainly wanted to know the effect class has on the individual and 
how individuals can use said knowledge to better conform to the status quo (Warner et al. 
1949: 7). Social Class in America is intended to be a sort of self-help manual for social 
climbing individuals, or an “easy means” to “know a situation and how to adjust to it,” so 
that it may serve as a “corrective instrument which will permit men and women to better 
evaluate their social situations and thereby better adapt themselves to social reality” 
(Warner et al. 1949: v-vii, 5). He was apparently oblivious to the moral problems 
inherent with such conformity. 
 Moving on, Warner provides professional sociology with two new methods for 
studying stratification: “Evaluated Participation” and “Index of Status Characteristics” 
(Warner et al. 1949: vi, 35).  
The first, “Evaluated Participation,” is based on the “propositions that those who 
interact in the social system of a community evaluate the participation of those around 
them, that the place where an individual participates is evaluated, and that members of 
the community are explicitly or implicitly aware of the ranking and translate their 
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evaluations of such social participation into social class ratings that can be communicated 
to the investigator” (Warner et al. 1949: 35). It is a qualitative method in which the “field 
man” uses his “interviewing skill” (Warner et al. 1949: 35). Evaluative Participation 
employs six basic techniques. First, informants from diverse backgrounds provide the 
researcher with perceived “rank orders” which are later “matched” and “counted” to 
establish a “Social-Class Configuration” (Warner et al. 1949: 37). Second, individuals 
can then be “rated” by the analyst based on “superior or inferior symbols” identified in 
the interviews (Warner et al. 1949: 37). Third, individuals and families are assigned to 
classes by the analyst based on their “reputation” provided by informants (Warner et al. 
1949: 37). The fourth technique allows the researcher to rate individuals and families 
based on comparisons to other informants (Warner et al. 1949: 37). Fifth, individuals and 
families can be assigned to a category based on “qualified informants” (Warner et al. 
1949: 38). Sixth, individuals and families can be ranked based on “Institutional 
Membership,” or “Real Interconnectedness” to cliques, associations, churches, etc. 
(Warner et al. 1949: 38). Evaluated Participation is therefore defined as a qualitative 
method that uses interviews to establish rankings based on the following variables: 
inclusion/exclusion, relative status, identification with symbols, and individual traits 
(Warner et al. 1949: 38-39). Of course, the problem with this method is that it relies 
entirely on individuals’ subjective perceptions of status, i.e. does not consider historical 
or objective realities whatsoever, let alone actual behaviors. You could essentially have a 
thousand factory workers who were brainwashed into thinking they were the bourgeoisie 
and if you employed Warner’s “Evaluated Participation” you would never know the 
difference! 
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The second method, the “Index of Status Characteristics,” is based on the 
propositions that “economic and other prestige factors are highly important and closely 
correlated with social class” and that these “social and economic factors, such as talent, 
income, and money, if their potentialities for rank are to be realized, must be translated 
into social-class behavior acceptable to the members of any given social level of the 
community” (Warner et al. 1949: 39). This is a quantitative method that “measures the 
socioeconomic levels of the community” and, in combination with qualitative analysis, 
allows the social scientist to “say what is meant in socioeconomic terms by such class 
concepts as upper, middle, and lower class” or “higher or lower socioeconomic levels” 
(Warner et al. 1949: 35). It is sold to the reader as being a completely “objective method” 
(Warner et al. 1949: 39) that is less complex, easily learned, and easily applied (Warner 
et al.1949: vi). It is an early prototype of contemporary SES.  
 The “Index of Status Characteristics” is essentially “an index of socioeconomic 
factors” that “can be used with a considerable degree of confidence as an index of social-
class position as well” (Warner et al. 1949: 39). The four variables that Warner 
recommends for the index are 1) “Occupation,” 2) “Source of Income,” 3) “House Type,” 
and 4) “Dwelling Area.” He later reintroduces 5) “Amount of Income” and 6) 
“Education” as additional variables; however, these were ultimately removed to make the 
index more ‘accurate’ and statistically reliable (Warner et al. 1949: 163-164). Each 
variable is broken down further and Warner provides a lengthy, detailed discussion for 
each one.  
Ratings of each variable are made on seven-point Likert scales, which are then 
weighted based on “importance” (Warner et al. 1949: 41). The weights are supposedly 
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“designed to secure the maximum degree of social-class prediction” (Warner et al. 1949: 
123). “Occupation” is multiplied by four, “Source of Income” by three, “House Type” by 
three, and “Dwelling Area” by two before finally being added together into a summation 
scale (Warner et al. 1949: 41, 123). The results are then finally stratified into arbitrary 
categories, or “social-class equivalents,” that “can be done in any one of several different 
ways” (Warner et al. 1949: 41). 
We cannot be sure if the “Index of Status Characteristics” merely reflected or in 
fact inspired the ‘white flight,’ suburban sprawl, and urban decay that occurred over the 
next few decades; however, one thing is certain, and this is that Warner’s scale is very 
problematic for several other reasons. The first is that, despite the claim that the index is 
“objective,” Warner immediately backslides into social constructivism, arguing that: 
 
In order for it to be a reliable instrument and an accurate index of social 
class, each of the four characteristics and the points in their scales must 
reflect how Americans feel and think about the relative worth of each job, 
the sources of income which support them, and the evaluation of their 
houses and neighborhoods in which they live, for it is not the house, or 
job, or the income, or the neighborhood that is being measured so much as 
the evaluations that are in the backs of our heads—evaluations placed 
there by our cultural tradition and our society…[they] are no more than 
evaluated symbols… (Warner et al. 1949: 40) 
 
 
In other words, Warner’s notion of “objective” is, again, actually quite subjective, 
and social class is limited to ideas in our heads. He is so concerned about disconnecting 
socioeconomic status from political economy and material reality that, in the end, his 
analysis of class never touches solid ground at any point. Both of his methods lead us to 
statistical measurements of arbitrary categories. For example, Warner admits that 
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“ethnicity has a definite effect—usually a limiting one—on social participation in the 
community” and can “pull down” individuals in particular ethnic groups (Warner et al. 
1949: 186-187). But he isn’t willing to place this downward mobility into a holistic, 
structural context. Instead, he keeps his analysis relative, arguing that “the relationship 
between social class and socioeconomic status may vary from ethnic group to ethnic 
group” and “from community to community” (Warner et al. 1949: 128). His notion of 
class is something that we construct—in other words, Warner’s notion of “class” here 
becomes “socioeconomic status,” or something that is not real, which is very different 
from Marx’s original concept of class, which is something that is, more than anything, 
lived, and all too real. 
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PETER BLAU & OTIS DUNCAN 
Influenced by Sorokin and Warner, a more descriptive, statistical treatment of 
stratification culminated in the work of Blau & Duncan in the 1960's (Burawoy 2004: 5). 
The American Occupational Structure not only provides us with the contemporary SES 
model, but also marks the point in which our attentions are directed away from social 
class and towards a ‘value-free’ snapshot of individual mobility within a supposedly 
‘meritocratic’ occupational structure.  
Blau & Duncan basically seek to “describe the patterns of social mobility in some 
detail, to estimate the influence of various factors on occupational life chances, and to 
ascertain a few consequences of socio-economic status and mobility” (1965: 4). In 
particular, they are interested in the effects of education, ethnic background, community 
size, migration, and parental family (Blau & Duncan 1965: 4). Understanding this is 
important because in their view the “occupational structure is the foundation of the 
stratification system of contemporary industrial society…class differences come to rest 
primarily on occupational positions and the economic advantages and powers associated 
with them” (Blau & Duncan 1967: vii). Therefore, they believe that “the understanding of 
social stratification in modern society is best promoted by the systematic investigation of 
occupational status and mobility” (Blau & Duncan 1967: 5). However, they are very 
quick to distinguish this project from grand theorizing: 
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Neither have we set ourselves the objective of formulating a theory of 
stratification on the basis of results of our empirical investigation. This 
does not mean that we have restricted our responsibility to reporting ‘the 
facts’…or that we favor an artificial separation of scientific research and 
theory. On the contrary, we seek to place our research findings into a 
theoretical framework and suggest theoretical implications for them. To 
bring theoretical considerations to bear upon our empirical data on 
occupational achievement an mobility, however, is a much more modest 
undertaking than to construct a theory of stratification. The latter is not the 
aim of this book… (Blau & Duncan 1967: 2) 
 
 
Blau & Duncan claim that Marx believed that social theories should be justified 
by their “action implications” and not by “objective scientific merits” (Blau & Duncan 
1967: 2). Of course, this is a gross misinterpretation. Next, we are reminded that Marx, 
Durkheim, or any other “broad theories of social class” have not really influenced 
American sociology, and that “most empirical studies of occupational mobility never 
refer to these theories” (Blau & Duncan 1967: 2-3). This is supposedly because 
“empirical studies of social status and mobility in one society cannot make the relevant 
comparisons…because each society constitutes merely a single case” (Blau & Duncan 
1967: 3). On the contrary, in their opinion grand theories involve a more “comparative 
framework,” which transcends a single empirical study (Blau & Duncan 1967: 3). 
Furthermore, they recognize that empirical studies tend to ignore “other institutional 
conditions in a society that produce the characteristic class structure” (Blau & Duncan 
1967: 3). So, Blau & Duncan assert that the general design of their “mobility research” is 
not suited for grand theorizing because “it centers attention not on the institutional 
differences between societies but on the differential conditions that affect occupational 
achievements and mobility…” (Blau & Duncan 1967: 3-4). So, here the measurement of 
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SES is portrayed as a ‘different project’ than class-based analyses, and that sociologists 
studying stratification sans social class are just doing something else entirely—that is 
equally important, of course. 
 Their primary goal is to illustrate the “analytic procedures” they used, which 
mainly rely on statistical regression (Blau & Duncan 1965: 4). They recommend said 
procedures because “it is a very efficient method of large-scale data reduction” and 
because “it permits, consequently, the simultaneous examination of the interrelations of 
fairly large numbers of variables, especially if computers are used” (Blau & Duncan 
1965: 4). They used official data from the United States’ census, both from the regular 
“Current Population Survey” and from a supplementary questionnaire that they designed 
to sample over twenty-thousand American men from non-farming backgrounds (Blau & 
Duncan 1965: 4-5). They do not really explain why women were excluded. 
They then used the data collected to calculate “SES,” or “socio-economic status” 
scores (Blau & Duncan 1965: 5). Here SES is essentially a scale which ranges from 0 to 
96 (Blau & Duncan 1965: 5). It is calculated based on three variables, or “predictors,” 
which consist of 1) income, 2) education, and 3) the N.O.R.C. prestige rating (Blau & 
Duncan 1965: 5). The latter is cited as being derived from the National Opinion Research 
Center’s 1947 “Jobs and Occupations” report (Blau & Duncan 1965: 23). They note a 
strong correlation (.91) for the scale (Blau & Duncan 1965: 5). An average of the scores 
for each “conventional major groups of nonfarm occupations” is then presented, e.g. 
“professionals and technicians” average 75, “managers, proprietors, and officials” have a 
mean score of 57, while “unskilled workers” are at the bottom with 7 (Blau & Duncan 
1965: 5). 
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Several conclusions emerge from these calculations. Because they calculate a 
weak to moderate correlation between father ‘s and son’s occupational status, Blau & 
Duncan argue that “there is much occupational mobility in the United States,” though 
they admit that it is not “excessive” compared to other Western countries (Blau & 
Duncan 1965: 6). More importantly, the relationship between father’s and son’s 
occupational status is “mediated in the United States by education” (Blau & Duncan 
1965: 7).  
To their credit, Blau & Duncan admit that “social origins also have a definite 
effect on occupational opportunities that has nothing to do with educational 
qualifications” (Blau & Duncan 1965: 8). They are obliged to discuss race and ethnicity; 
however, they explain away this inequality meritocratically through “differential access 
to educational facilities” and various groups having “lower social origins than whites” 
(Blau & Duncan 1965: 8-9). For example, “discrimination notwithstanding,” they mainly 
blame racial inequality on “serious educational handicaps” (Blau & Duncan 1965: 8). 
They then hint at a problematic reality: “occupational advancement” depends on 
education, but there is a relationship between the education an individual receives and the 
SES of their parents (Blau & Duncan 1965: 7). Blau & Duncan want to avoid this issue, 
however, and instead focus more on the effect education has on social mobility in general 
(Blau & Duncan 1965: 7). Put simply, formal education becomes a hallowed solution to 
inequality. 
Growing up in or near a large city is also an occupational advantage due to the 
labor market and educational opportunities (Blau & Duncan 1965: 17). However, Blau & 
Duncan also discover that individuals with the highest SES scores live in the “suburban 
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fringe,” and that larger cities tend to have higher scores than smaller cities (1965: 11). 
The lowest average is typically rural areas (Blau & Duncan 1965: 11). While there is no 
definite “pattern” presented, migrants tend to have significantly lower scores than non-
migrants (Blau & Duncan 1965: 12-15). 
They also discuss the family, asserting that smaller family-size produces higher 
SES (Blau & Duncan 1965: 17). They conclude that “a man’s chances of occupational 
success are impeded by many siblings” (Blau & Duncan 1965: 17). This seems to be a 
spurious correlation, however—betraying the danger of analyzing social class solely 
through abstract statistical calculations—because it confuses causation with effect, i.e. 
lower class families tend to bear more children because of cultural factors, lack of family 
planning, a need for more labor, etc. So, one could argue that Blau & Duncan are here 
ignoring class reproduction. They later even admit this, writing that “the superior 
occupational achievements of children from small families are largely accounted for by 
the better economic conditions in which they find themselves…” (Blau & Duncan 1965: 
20). 
Blau & Duncan conclude that patterns of mobility indicate just two “class 
boundaries,” essentially dividing up Americans into three broad classes: 1) middle class 
or white-collar, 2) working class or blue-collar, and 3) agricultural class or farm workers 
(Blau & Duncan 1967: 78). “No other possible division among occupations,” they claim, 
“sets such clear-cut limits on downward movements” but these divisions “permits upward 
mobility in excess of chance” (Blau & Duncan 1967: 78). The “lowest occupations” of 
each class function as “distinctive entry occupations” through which individuals move 
between classes (Blau & Duncan 1967: 79). Social class and inequality is here obscured 
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by economic ‘sector’, hiding the power relations and historical inequalities that produce 
stratification. 
There are three interesting characteristics found in Blau & Duncan’s research. 
First, quite surprisingly, they were under no illusions that they were theoretically biased: 
 
Confronted by the same set of qualitative data, two men do not necessarily 
arrive at the same conclusion regarding the empirical ‘facts’ of the case, 
let alone regarding the inferences to be drawn from them…Orders of 
significance and priority of emphasis may fail to coincide, and what looks 
like an interesting discovery from one point of view seems trivial from 
another. (Blau & Duncan 1967: viii-ix) 
 
 
 Second, Blau & Duncan believe that the major limitation of their study is that it 
fails to account for the “different dimensions of social stratification” prescribed by Weber 
(Blau & Duncan 1967: 5). This not only betrays the powerful effect Weber is still having 
on professional sociologists in the United States, but somewhat undermines the very 
reasons that professional sociology embraces their model, i.e. because it is supposedly the 
epitome of ‘value-free’ and ‘multi-dimensional’ analysis. 
Third, they argue that using the sole criterion of economic location is no longer 
adequate for studying stratification, supposedly because the “men in control” are 
“themselves employees of corporations” and “the economy is dominated by corporations 
rather than individual proprietors” (Blau & Duncan 1967: 6). While economic location is 
most significant, “occupational position” is assumed to be more related to one’s “prestige 
status” (Blau & Duncan 1967: 6). What this really does is detach occupation from social 
structure and economic location, and place it into an idealistic hierarchy of subjective 
perceptions, which are more often than not the product of ideology and social institutions. 
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“Prestige status” is therefore, more than anything, a convenient way of maintaining the 
status quo because it reproduces power relations and avoids putting occupations into a 
hierarchy of real power relations. 
 Consequently, wholeheartedly embracing Blau & Duncan, American sociologists 
have since replaced class-based theories with this conceptual model of “socio-economic 
status” or “SES” (Burawoy 2004: 5; Ferris & Stein 2010: 213; Macionis 2007: 269). 
Contemporary SES is essentially a multi-dimensional ranking based on four variables: 
income, wealth, education, and occupational prestige (Macionis 2007: 269, 280-282).  
The problem is that, lacking a good theoretical foundation, SES simply measures 
distributive aspects of social class, i.e. individual characteristics of people within a class 
structure (Coser 1975: 694). It ignores relational aspects of social class: “There is no 
concern here with the ways in which differential class power and social advantage 
operate in predictable and routine ways, through specifiable social interactions between 
classes or interest groups, to give shape to determinate social structures and to create 
differential life chances” (Coser 1975: 694). SES limits our ability to provide a full 
accounting of major societal forces (Coser 1975: 695). According to Coser (1975: 695), 
SES consequently gives us a “bowdlerized” version of social stratification that 
oversimplifies and distorts our analysis.  
Coser (1975: 694) also suggests that there is a historical relationship between 
methodological fetishism and SES. Exclusive concern for a precise measurement of the 
distributive aspects draws attention away from more important aspects of class, including 
the monopolization of socio-political mechanisms, the interdependence of wealth and 
poverty, institutional factors, differential location, etc. (Coser 1975: 694-695). In other 
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words, SES does not account for power or conflict, the historical aspects of class, or 
macro-level social structures. It ignores important factors, such as the role race, gender 
discrimination, and social networks play in reproducing social class (Waldinger & 
Lichter 2003).  
The SES model is highly influenced in American ideology of individual 
achievement (Coser 1975: 695). It limits the study of stratification and inequality to “a 
study of mobility within a hierarchy of occupational prestige” (Burawoy 2004: 6). Much 
like Warner, this is much more compatible with capitalist ideology and the American 
myth of meritocracy than class-based theories. However, social class is not limited to 
individual characteristics (Coser 1975: 694; Schwalbe 2008: 13). 
Contemporary SES now assumes a natural statistical correlation between 
education, occupation, and income; however, recent trends have revealed this correlation 
to be weakening. College prices are rising, incomes for college graduates are falling, and 
student loan debts are crippling (Mooney 2008: 43). More and more people are 
graduating from college and finding themselves unable to find work, or, if they are able 
to find a job, they are being paid less and less (Jones & McClusky 2011). The average 
income for a new college graduate is just $36,000 (Mooney 2008: 52). Professional 
employment is also less secure, with contingent workers now comprising 33 percent of 
the workforce (Mooney 2008: 72). 75% of college students rely on student loans to fund 
their education and the average undergraduate carries close to $20,000 in student debt, 
with most graduate students owing up to $46,000 or more (Mooney 2008: 48). More 
importantly, SES ignores affiliation and falsely treats all degrees as if they are equal 
(Schwalbe 2008: 76-80). Lumping education into broad statistical categories ultimately 
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helps to skew the statistics and hide the relationship between social class, educational 
attainment, and income. 
While Blau & Duncan were aware of the theoretical limitations of SES, they 
unfortunately produced a Frankenstein monster that has since made its way through the 
history of American sociology. The contemporary profession more often than not takes 
the concept of SES for granted as the way to study stratification, frequently oblivious to 
its theoretical limitations, and consequently ignores crucial aspects of stratification and 
social class in American society. 
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E.P. THOMPSON 
In reaction to professional sociology, Thompson attempted to take the concept of 
class away from bourgeois academics and give it back to the proletariat. He wanted to 
show that class is not defined by social scientists or intellectuals; rather, it is defined by 
“men as they live their own history” and “in the end, this is its only definition” 
(Thompson 1966: 11). He attacks Marxists who define class “almost mathematically,” 
i.e. in terms of a theoretical structure or “so many men who stand in a certain relation to 
production” (Thompson 1966: 10). On the other hand, he is critical of sociologists who 
insist that class is merely a “pejorative theoretical construct, imposed upon the evidence” 
(Thompson 1966: 10). This is an implicit reference to functionalists who regard class as 
“a component of social structure,” and use this notion to assert that class-consciousness is 
a “bad thing” simply because it disturbs social harmony (Thompson 1966: 10). 
Thompson was especially critical of the “methodological preoccupations of certain 
sociologists” (Thompson 1966: 11). Consequently, drawing on Marx's assertion that 
people make history but not the conditions of their own choosing, he mainly focused on 
class as a lived experience, attempting to give the “explanatory power” back to those 
experiencing said conditions (Skeggs 2004: 41-42).  
In doing so, Thompson argues that class is a “structured process, made by those 
who lived structural divisions of labor,” i.e. class-consciousness is the defining feature of 
class itself (Skeggs 2004: 41). In his view, the working class is “present at its own 
making,” and, more importantly, this “making” is an active process that the working class 
plays a part in (Thompson 1966: 1). For Thompson, class can only be understood as a 
“social and cultural formation” that arises from “processes which can only be studied as 
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they work themselves out over a considerable historical period” (Thompson 1966: 11). 
He even goes as far as saying that “if we stop history at any given point, then there are no 
classes but simply a multitude of individuals with a multitude of experiences” (Thompson 
1966: 11). He thereby redefines the concept of class: 
 
By class I understand an historical phenomenon, unifying a number of 
disparate and seemingly unconnected events, both in the raw material of 
experience and in consciousness. I emphasize that it is a historical 
phenomenon. I do not see class as a “structure,” nor even as a “category,” 
but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have 
happened) in human relationships...class happens when some men, as a 
result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the 
identity of their interests as between themselves, and against other men 
whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs. 
(Thompson 1966: 1) 
 
 
Our concept of class is nothing but a “descriptive term” that “loosely ties together 
a bundle of discrete phenomena” and ultimately “evades as much as it defines” 
(Thompson 1966: 1). Trying to “anatomize the structure” of class relations or produce a 
“pure specimen” is futile because class involves a fluid relationship that “evades 
analysis” (Thompson 1966: 1). Furthermore, there cannot be “distinct classes” with an 
“independent being” because class is relational (Thompson 1966: 1). Rather, the idea of 
class, what it is and what it means, is owned and managed by the people who actively 
create it.  
Thompson's intentions were seemingly to show that ‘class’ is something that 
really happens, regardless of academic debate or methodology. Unfortunately, he used 
problematic language and perhaps went too far in his polemic against social theorists and 
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statisticians. First, the language used by Thompson portrays class as something entirely 
subjective: it has no objective foundations (in an epistemological sense) that can be 
studied; and, without class-consciousness, it seems to vanish altogether. Would laborers 
in a factory who believed they were upper class still be considered working class? 
Second, this also limits the sociological study of class to long-term subjective 
perceptions. Class cannot be understood cross-sectionally or in the short-term, and we 
have no bearings for what class is in the present, at least at the macro-level. Third, 
Thompson removes the objective structure from class-analysis, thereby making class 
relations limited to experiences and interests, and stripping away class as a political or 
socio-economic phenomenon. This makes Thompson attractive to post-modern 
theoreticians who want to portray class as a contextual social construction—without 
expressing any objective 'truth.' Worse still, denying that class can be seen as a category 
makes Thompson utterly useless to professional sociologists who want to study class 
empirically. 
Of course, should we forgive Thompson for his rhetoric and appreciate him for 
his main point—that class is something that happens, and that it is an idea that belongs to 
working people, regardless of academic debate—then we see that he is in fact an 
important figure in the history of American sociology. Furthermore, Thompson was not 
against, say, showing how technology influences the idea of class, as he did in his well 
known essay Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism, which explores “How 
far, and in what ways, did this shift in time-sense affect labour discipline, and how far did 
it influence the inward apprehension of time of working people?” (Thompson [1967] 
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1982: 300). He just wanted to show that class is all too real, but perhaps not in the sense 
that professional sociologists prefer to perceive reality. 
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ANTHONY GIDDENS 
Giddens produced a mixed-bag of complex ideas that must be considered because 
he had a major impact on American sociology. First, Giddens’s most worthy contribution 
is in the realm of practice theory, and in particular the agency-structure debate (Ritzer 
2008: 85). Second, while Giddens is not a Marxist, and incorporates a wide range of 
theories, Marxian theories had a major influence on his work (Ritzer 2008: 395). Because 
of this, Giddens is, ultimately, a leading figure in both the “critical responses to 
structural-functionalism” and “the contemporary revival of Marxist scholarship in the 
West” (Giddens 1973: 15-16). He presents a critical summary of Marxist and Weberian 
thought that has become highly influential. Finally, one of his central projects was to 
provide sociologists with a new analysis of stratification and social class. 
 Giddens’s “structuration theory” is one of the most renowned efforts to integrate 
agency and structure (Ritzer 2008: 395). He argues that mainstream sociology has 
historically focused too much on structural constraints and not enough on human actors. 
Rejecting the over-determination of mainstream structural-functionalism, he proposes 
that structure and agency should be viewed as an interdependent “duality,” i.e. that social 
structures are both constraining and enabling (Ritzer 2008: 85; 396). In the process of 
presenting this theory, Giddens articulates a new definition of “social structure” that is 
steeped in idealism; which has, in many ways, since become quite popular in American 
sociology. 
 Social structures, according to Giddens, are redefined as “the structuring 
properties [rules and resources]…the properties which make it possible for discernibly 
similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend 
 
 
91 
 
them systematic form…structure is what gives form and shape to social life, but it is not 
itself that form and shape” (Ritzer 2008: 398). For Giddens, social structures are not 
comparable to “the girders of a building” or “the skeleton of a body” (Ritzer 2008: 398). 
Consequently, a social structure does not exist in time and space, but “only exists in and 
through the activities of human agents” (Ritzer 2008: 398). It is instead conceived to be a 
dialectical relationship between ideas and actions, or between institutions and individuals, 
that leads to social reproduction (Ritzer 2008: 398-399). This definition of course 
reminds us of a Verstehen-induced detachment from the material world that is all too 
common is sociological theory, and serves to ensure a clear-cut break from Marx. 
When reading Giddens, we should keep in mind that his “new framework” is 
heavily influenced by his own political leanings, especially his relationship with the 
bourgeois London School of Economics and the Tony Blair administration. While the 
mainstream has since perceived him to be a vehicle of Marxist thought, he is far from 
being a Marxist in the traditional sense; in fact, he explicitly rejects the vast majority of 
Marx's ideas. Comparable to Durkheim, Giddens is more of a moderate who seems to 
embrace an idealistic capitalism that is perceived to be driven and maintained by a 
utopian social democracy (Giddens 1973: 285). Like Durkheim, he remains charitable to 
Marx, but goes off in a completely different direction: 
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I make no bones about declaring that new departures are needed in 
contemporary social theory...But I might stress that this book should not 
be regarded as the latest in a well-populated line of attempts to 'refute' 
Marx by showing how inappropriate his ideas are to the industrial order 
which has progressed far beyond nineteenth-century capitalism. I do 
believe however that, in a fundamental sense, in the industrialised third of 
the world, we live in a society which is both 'post-Marxist' and 'post-
bourgeois,' although not in a society which is 'post-capitalist,' let alone 
'post-industrial.' (Giddens 1973: 19) 
 
 
 
 Giddens’s metatheoretical assumptions can be summarized as follows. First and 
foremost, he outright rejects Marx's materialism, arguing that “it is not legitimate to claim 
that, because men must eat to live, their mode of life is necessarily determined by the 
manner in which they produce what they eat...It is even less valid to hold that the 
structure characteristic of a given society is controlled by the type of technique employed 
in production” (Giddens 1973: 87). Of course, this is easier for an upper class scholar to 
say than a manual worker who spends half his day working on a machine.  
That said, this belief has several notable effects: while Giddens does not 
completely reject historical analysis, he intends to leave us skeptical of historical analyses 
undertaken by classical theorists. He argues that class-based theories have been 
“obfuscated” by oversimplified comparisons between historical periods (Giddens 1973: 
19).  
Second, much like Weber, rejecting materialism allows him to detach the social 
from both technology and economic behavior. Giddens denounces the assertion that the 
characteristic nature of a society is governed by technological development, and rejects 
the conclusion that social evolution is consequently teleological, because it supposedly 
distorts our analysis of stratification (Giddens 1973: 19). In his opinion “technocratic 
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theories” and terms such as “post-industrial society” and “counter-culture” should be 
“severely censured” (Giddens 1973: 21-22). However, while he explicitly rejects 
materialism, he is also critical of Weberian theories. To his credit, Giddens does assert 
that “socio-economic infrastructure,” and not just “cultural values,” should be considered 
when trying to understand social development; however, he proposes the primary 
determinants of class structures are “political influences” (Giddens 1973: 20-21). In 
summary, he seems to walk a fine line between Marx and Weber that retreats into the 
safe and well-ordered haven of legitimate political institutions. 
Several other challenges to Marxian theories are offered. Giddens also believes 
that the concept of “class structuration” should replace the notion of the “existence” or 
“non-existence” of social classes, i.e. because stratification is inevitable we should now 
discuss “types and levels” (Giddens 1973: 20). Next, the Marxian theory that capitalism 
is systematically superseded by state intervention in economic life is to be turned on its 
head: according to Giddens, capitalism actually becomes “fully developed” through state 
intervention (Giddens 1973: 22). Furthermore, state socialism is not the “transcendence” 
of capitalist society, but merely a different form of industrial society that is manifested 
from the “paradox of socialism,” which is defined as the conflict between 1) “freedom” 
and 2) “equality,” or between 1) the principle of economic regulation “according to 
human need” and 2) the rejection of “exploitative domination of man over man” 
(Giddens 1973: 22). Finally, “convergence theory,” which proposes that the differences 
between capitalist states and socialist states are naturally diminishing, should be rejected 
based on the latter propositions (Giddens 1973: 21). 
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 That said, Giddens refers to the issue of social classes and class conflict as “the 
problem” in sociology (Giddens 1973: 19). He is critical of both Marxism and 
mainstream sociology for failing to come to grips with social class. “For some while, as it 
is presented in the works of non-Marxist sociologists at least,” writes Giddens, “the 
concept of class seems to have become enveloped with a sort of atmosphere of seedy 
decay” (Giddens 1973: 9). Giddens critiques the “complete sterility” of Twentieth 
Century, orthodox Marxism because social theorists in this school were frequently 
reluctant to challenge dogma, reinterpret theories, or consider alternatives (Giddens 1973: 
17-18). On the other hand, professional sociologists perceive 'class' to be outdated and 
have prematurely rejected it based on false premises, or because unreasonable demands 
have been directed at the concept itself (Giddens 1973: 10). The concept is also harmed 
by “confusion and ambiguity” in the discipline, and because there have been few 
“distinctive and considered attempts to revise the theory of class upon a broad scale” 
(Giddens 1973: 10). The result is, of course, that many sociologists have grown 
“dissatisfied with it as an instrument of sociological analysis” (Giddens 1973: 10).  
In reaction to this, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies consequently 
begins where Ossowski left off: in attempting to better understand concepts drawn from 
the “European tradition of class theory” and thereby “work out a new framework” for 
sociological analysis (Giddens 1973: 9). In doing so, Giddens takes a grand, 
philosophical approach. He mainly discusses class at the level of what he calls “abstract 
models,” or theories which apply to all types of class systems, which is distinct from 
“concrete models,” or descriptions of the specific characteristics of social classes in 
particular societies (Giddens 1973: 27). He believed that this was Marx’s approach to 
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conceptualizing social class. Giddens also explicitly rejects the contemporary SES model, 
writing: “this is not the same as saying that class is a 'multi-dimensional' phenomenon 
which can be analyzed as an aggregate of several hierarchical 'dimensions,’ as is 
sometimes claimed by certain of those (mis)interpreters of Weber” (Giddens 1973: 273). 
However, Giddens does not provide us with any new concepts to understand class, nor 
does he offer a clear framework of concepts. He simply asserts that “class structuration 
has most strongly developed at three levels, separating the upper, middle and working 
classes” (Giddens 1973: 273). These three levels could supposedly change at any time, 
however (Giddens 1973: 273). More importantly, his idealistic notion of social structure 
ultimately limits his theory of stratification because it keeps him from seeing the 
relationships between classes, or from connecting classes to economic reality. He argues 
that “class divisions cannot be drawn like lines on a map, and the extent to which class 
structuration occurs depends on the interaction of various sets of factors...” (Giddens 
1973: 273). Here he ironically takes the Weberian route away from conflict—into a 
confused pluralism meant to avoid real economics and power interests. 
Giddens was mainly concerned with understanding social class because he 
favored capitalism. He does recognize that capitalism necessarily implies a class society 
(Giddens 1973: 273). However, in his view, capitalism has not maintained feudal 
relations, as Marx believed, supposedly because 1) class-systems are by default “open” to 
social mobility, 2) the dominant class is not as “clearly distinct a grouping” as the feudal 
aristocracy, and 3) class itself is a “variable phenomenon” (Giddens 1973: 273). Giddens 
counters that “the basic structural trait of capitalist society is that of an institutional 
mediation of power involving the separation of the 'political' and the 'economic,' such that 
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the characteristic modes of participation in one sphere are not determined by those in 
another” (Giddens 1973: 286). He believes that capitalism operates through “pluralism,” 
which he defines as “a reliance on markets and plans and group-bargaining; towards 
several or even many centres of power rather than more or only one; towards infinitely 
complex mixtures of rationality and irrationality, morality and immorality, principle and 
pragmatism; towards many managers and even more who are managed; towards many 
conflicts over rules and rewards” (Giddens 1973: 274). Consequently, in Beyond Left and 
Right: The Future of Radical Politics, Giddens attempts to reconstitute “radical politics” 
according to a “utopian realism,” seeking to strike a balance between utopian ideals and 
the realities of modern life, including the acceptance of many aspects of capitalism and 
the rejection of many aspects of socialism (Ritzer 2008: 428). 
Of course, these assumptions are wrong: we know that the political and economic 
are not separate because the economically powerful have significantly more legitimate 
political influence than the lower classes, and that they actively influence political 
outcomes. More importantly, Piven (2006) has shown that positive political outcomes 
usually occur through disruption of the capitalist system, not through normal politics or 
institutional mediation—as Giddens would have us believe. 
 In summary, though far less influential in British and European circles, Giddens 
has been highly influential in the United States (Ritzer 2008: 425). While his theoretical 
perspective was ultimately skewed by his own ideology and social location, Giddens 
remains an important figure in the history of American sociology because, more than 
anything, he did help to revive the theoretical importance of Marx and inspire 
contemporary discussions of stratification and social class.  
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ERIK OLIN WRIGHT 
 Wright is considered by many to be the leading expert on Marxist class analysis in 
American sociology. He began his career attempting to “clarify the critical contours of 
the current debates within Marxist theory about the proper way to conceptualize the class 
structure of advanced capitalist societies” (Wright 1978: 2). He mainly wants to show 
non-Marxists that Marxian theories are compatible with professional sociology and can 
be useful in “pursuing systematic empirical research,” i.e. Wright hopes to demonstrate 
that “Marxist class analysis could be carried out with the same empirical rigor as non-
Marxist stratification research and that it could generate sociological interesting empirical 
results” (Wright 1997: 545).  
 At the same time, he seeks to show Marxists and other “Left-wing scholars” that 
“knowledge within class analysis could be pursued using conventional quantitative 
research methods” (Wright 1997: 545). Wright therefore seeks to “reconstruct Marxist 
thought” so that it accepts “systematic quantitative investigation” (Wright 1997: 546). He 
is frustrated that Marxists are generally skeptical of quantitative methodology and prefer 
qualitative approaches, e.g. historical analysis (Wright 1997: 545-546). “Traditional 
Marxist skepticism toward quantitative methods,” argues Wright, “goes beyond a simple 
judgment about the appropriate kinds of data needed...it has also reflected a general 
hostility by many (although not all) Marxists to anything that smacked of 'bourgeois 
social science'“ (Wright 1997: 546). Consequently, Wright's overall project is to offer 
sociologists the “foundations of a neo-Marxist class analysis” (Wright 2005: 7). Said 
analysis seems to wholeheartedly embrace professional norms. 
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 Wright is critical of concepts that portray class as a simple polarization. He argues 
that “the category of all wage-earners is far too heterogeneous in its basic interests to 
provide a structural basis for class formation. It is simply implausible to claim that top 
managerial positions are part of the proletariat, have class interests fundamentally 
identical to those of industrial workers and fundamentally opposed to capitalists” (Wright 
1978: 19). At the same time, he is also critical of SES and various Weberian theories that 
focus on exchange as an indicator of class: “The claim that skills and credentials 
constitute a special form of property comes very close to Weber's and Gidden’s 
arguments that it is market capacity that defines class location...[On the contrary] many 
workers with considerable skills and credentials lose all control over their labor once they 
enter the employment relation, and thus should be considered fully proletarianized...skills 
constitute a qualitatively different kind of property” (Wright 1978: 21-22). Moving away 
from these cynical Marxists and neo-Weberian theorists, Wright basically wants to shift 
the emphasis to a quantitative analysis of “relations of domination/subordination” 
(Wright 1978: 50).  
 Wright is a “committed partisan” in the “elaboration and defense of the structural 
relations” of what he calls “contradictory functions” or “contradictory structural 
relations” (Wright 1978: 5). In this view, “not all positions within the production process 
fall unambiguously into a single class location” because some locations are “objectively 
torn between classes” (Wright 1978: 5). In a somewhat Weberian maneuver, class 
becomes multi-dimensional, not according to the dimensions of economic class, social 
status, and political party, but instead according to dimensions of social production. 
Wright explicitly divides production into “three interconnected dimensions” of 
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domination and subordination: 1) “real economic ownership” or “money capital,” or the 
flow of investments and accumulation; 2) “possessions” or “physical capital,” which are 
the actual means of production; and 3) “labor,” defined as “the laboring activity of the 
direct producers within production” (Wright 1978: 6-7). He next puts Marxist class 
struggles into this context, defining class relations as “a polarized, antagonistic relation 
along all three of these dimensions,” with capitalists dominating labor through control of 
the first and second dimensions (Wright 1978: 7). Classes are then defined according to 
their location within this maelstrom. For example, the working class is squarely situated 
within the dimension of labor, and mostly excluded from the other two dimensions.  
 “Other classes enter into the analysis” at lower levels of abstraction when 
sociologists study particular societies because “pre-capitalist relations of production exist 
side-by-side with capitalist relations” and because the three dimensions “need not 
necessarily coincide perfectly” and this “non-correspondence” generates “contradictory 
structural relations” (Wright 1978: 8). These contradictory classes include: 1) managers 
and supervisors, who are on one hand ultimately excluded from control or money capital 
(relative to the capitalist class) but who, at the same time, maintain a “certain real degree 
of control of the physical means of production and over the labor of workers within 
production” (Wright 1978: 8); 2) small employers who occupy a location between the 
petit bourgeoisie and the capitalist class and, like the capitalist class, are in a relation of 
exploitation with workers, but at the same time, unlike the capitalist class, are often 
directly engaged with production and do not accumulate large amounts of capital (Wright 
1978: 9); and 3) semi-autonomous employees, who occupy a contradictory location 
between the petty bourgeoisie and the working class because they “do have some real 
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control of their immediate physical means of production” but are usually “excluded from 
any control over money capital and the labor of others” (Wright 1978: 9).  
Keep in mind that Wright argues that these classes are not contradictory because 
they are “pigeonholed,” or located between other classes in some hierarchy; rather, in his 
view they are contradictory because they “simultaneously share the relational 
characteristics of two distinct classes” and consequently “share class interests with two 
different classes, but have interests identical to neither” (Wright 1978: 10). 
 Furthermore, positions located “outside immediate class production,” including 
state employees, housewives, pensioners, students, etc., are “outside the class structure” 
because they are “situated within class relations through social relations other than 
production relationships” (Wright 1978: 11). Wright admits that his overall schema is 
problematic, somewhat arbitrary, and likely to be modified, but the schema is still 
superior because it provides “a fairly comprehensive way of locating positions within the 
social relations of production” (Wright 1978: 10). 
 Next, Wright continues the ‘quantitative turn’ and attempts to reconcile Marx 
with the methods of Sorokin, Warner, etc. We are to fill in these categories based on a 
quantitative methodology—i.e., statistics derived from survey research—that 
“operationalizes” these concepts using formulas that calculate scales of “self-
employment,” “decision-making participation,” “authority,” “position within the formal 
hierarchy,” “managerial location,” and “autonomy” (Wright et al. 1982). His paper 
entitled “American Class Structure” supposedly “presents the first systematic 
investigation of the American class structure based on data from an explicitly Marxian, 
relational perspective” (Wright et al. 1982). Instead of defining classes according to 
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“occupations,” Wright sets out to define class categories “in terms of social relations of 
control over investments, decision-making, other peoples' work, and one's own work” 
using quantitative data from a national survey (Wright et al. 1982). He later presents a 
more complex, quantitative “class matrix” intended to provide “a general framework for 
the analysis of class” that supposedly portrays “the basic outlines of the class structure” 
(Wright 1985). 
 Besides catering to methodological fetishism, Wright's model throws us into an 
overly-complex and confused predicament. Because he is committed to portraying 
classes as contradictory, he ultimately reaches the conclusion, based on his matrix, that: 
“The American class structure cannot therefore be represented by any simply scheme of 
class polarization” because “close to half of all locations within the class structure have a 
'contradictory character'“ (Wright et al. 1982). In other words, half the population is 
somewhere between social classes according to Wright, which makes his theory 
unattractive and problematic. More than anything, this seems to be a theoretical distortion 
of Marx that is driven by methodological fetishism and professional norms; for Marx, the 
only inherent contradiction in capitalism was bourgeois exploitation, and, rather than 
being a natural result of ‘contradictory’ social locations, conflict within the class structure 
is related to this deliberate, active domination. 
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PIERRE BOURDIEU 
 A European theorist, Bourdieu has recently had a tremendous influence in the 
United States. Going back to Marx, Bourdieu's social theory tries to reunite the subjective 
and the objective, i.e. recognize the connection between the social and the material by 
presenting a model of the social world as a physical space (Ritzer 2008: 330). Distilled 
for simplicity, Bourdieu's theoretical model of society revolves around four concepts: 1) 
“fields,” or arenas of social life that generate complex networks of rules and relations, 
and support specific practices necessary to maintain themselves; 2) “habitus,” or the 
system of dispositions to action produced out of past conditioning and the structuring of 
one's actions towards stimuli in the field; 3) “practice,” or actions that manifest through 
the mechanism of habitus in order to navigate the field; and 4) “capital,” or various 
resources the individual attempts to acquire, convert, and use in practice (Ritzer 2008: 
329). The latter includes economic capital (wealth), social capital (relationships), cultural 
capital (knowledge of how to practice in a particular field), and symbolic capital 
(prestige). Working together, these four processes form what we usually refer to as 
'everyday life': “One of the fundamental effects of the orchestration of habitus is the 
production of a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity secured by consensus 
of the meaning (sens) of practices and the world, in other words the harmonization of 
agents’ experiences and the continuous reinforcement that each of them receives from [all 
forms of] expression…” (Bourdieu 1977: 80). 
Bourdieu hopes that understanding the essential relationship between fields, 
habitus, and practice will catalyze liberation. “The theory of knowledge,” writes 
Bourdieu, “is a dimension of political theory because the specifically symbolic power to 
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impose the principles of the construction of reality—in particular, social reality—is a 
major dimension of political power” (Bourdieu 1977:165). He argues that “doing one’s 
duty as a man means conforming to the social order, and this is fundamentally a question 
of respecting rhythms, keeping pace, not falling out of line” (Bourdieu 1977:161). His 
critique of taste is explicitly intended to undermine such conformity. 
His social theory attempts to show just how arbitrary, malleable, and prescribed 
everyday life really is, thereby exposing what he refers to here as “doxa,” or aspects of 
our habitus which are routinely taken for granted through an “absolute form of 
recognition of legitimacy through misrecognition of arbitrariness” (Bourdieu 1977: 165-
166; 168). Next, Bourdieu wants to expose how individuals are programmed to adhere to 
a “sense of limits” or “the sense of reality,” defined as “the correspondence between the 
objective classes and the internalized classes, social structures and mental structures, 
which is the basis of the most ineradicable adherence to the established social order” 
(Bourdieu 1977:164). In other words, the most fundamental feature of social control is to 
determine what is seen as possible and impossible. This includes a bourgeois 
maintenance of the “universe of discourse” in academics and the media, “a range of ideas 
which is either expressed or understood as containing the whole matter of discussion” 
(Bourdieu 1977: 170). It also includes the avoidance of class, because “everything 
conspires to conceal the relationship between work and its product” (Bourdieu 1977: 
176).  
Distinction basically refers us back to Veblen's concept of conspicuous 
consumption. “Consumption is, in this case, a stage in a process of communication,” 
writes Bourdieu, “that is, an act of deciphering, decoding, which presupposes practical or 
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explicit mastery of a cipher or code...one can say that the capacity to see (voir) is a 
function of knowledge (savoir)...the implementation of a cognitive acquirement, a 
cultural code” (Bourdieu 1984: 2-3). Consumption and taste are the product of fields, 
related to social location, and consequently “bound up” in a habitus that is a characteristic 
of different classes and class fractions (Bourdieu 1984: 6). This means that our “cultural 
needs are the product of upbringing and education” (Bourdieu 1984: 1). Tastes 
consequently function as markers of social class (Bourdieu 1984: 2). One’s taste is 
embedded in class relations: 
 
Taste is a practical mastery of distributions which makes it possible to 
sense or intuit what is likely (or unlikely) to befall—and therefore befit—
an individual occupying a given position in social space…a ‘sense of 
one’s place’, guiding the occupants of a given place in social space 
towards the social positions adjusted to their properties, and towards the 
practices or goods which befit the occupants of that position. (Bourdieu 
1984: 466-467) 
 
 
 Again, Bourdieu is pointing all this out in an effort to liberate the masses from 
cultural domination. He shows that class conflict is centered on the struggle to define 
“cultural nobility” (Bourdieu 1984: 2). Studying consumption and taste scientifically is 
meant to “abolish the sacred frontier which makes legitimate culture a separate universe” 
and overturn the bourgeois “denial of lower, coarse, vulgar, venal, servile—in a word, 
natural—enjoyment,” which all too often “implies an affirmation of superiority” upon the 
lower classes (Bourdieu 1984: 6-7).  
 According to Bourdieu, given what it knows, sociology must reflexively “use its 
own instruments to find out what it is and what it is doing, to try to better know where it 
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stands,” so that it “continually turns back onto itself the scientific weapons it produces” 
(Ritzer 2008: A-5). This includes an enlightened recognition of the strategies, of both 
individual sociologists and the discipline itself, that are employed to achieve 
“distinction,” or “euphemized assertions of power” (Ritzer 2008: A-6). Such a project is 
crucial because sociologists need to “avoid being the toy of social forces in [their] 
practice of sociology...to try to cleanse [their] work of...social determinants” (Ritzer 
2008: A-6). This includes 'freeing' sociologists from the “symbolic violence” committed 
against them by other, more powerful sociologists (Ritzer 2008: A-6). Therefore, a 
sociology of sociology, rather than seeking to undermine sociology, is meant to 
effectively “free it from those forces which determine it” (Ritzer 2008: A-6). 
Metatheorists, engaging in a systematic study of the underlying structure of sociology in 
general, as well as its various components and theories, are consequently performing a 
crucial task (Ritzer 2008: A-1). Consequently, one of Bourdieu’s main projects was 
“relating intellectual products and producers to their social conditions of existence” 
(Bourdieu 1984: xiii). 
Bourdieu wants sociologists to “refuse the dichotomy” between the subjective and 
objective, to move beyond the opposition between “social physics,” or using statistics to 
depict “quantified expressions” of objective distributions on one hand, and “social 
semiology,” or the qualitative methods of deciphering subjective meanings, on the other 
hand (Bourdieu 1984: 482). He also explicitly rejects the identification of social classes 
according to “discrete groups” or “simple countable populations separated by 
boundaries” (Bourdieu 1984: 483). He instead wants sociologists to focus on defining 
social class according to the “practical knowledge” of agent-subjects; however, far from 
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being a denial of the material, this is because Bourdieu is reuniting the ‘social’ with 
material space, and consequently regards practical knowledge itself as being composed of 
“divisions and classifications which are no less objective than those of the balance sheets 
of social physics” (Bourdieu 1984: 483). Schemes of habitus thereby serve to “engage the 
most fundamental principles of construction and evaluation of the social world” and 
“directly express the division of labour (between the classes, the age groups and the 
sexes)” or, in other words, “the division of the work of domination” (Bourdieu 1984: 
466). A holistic understanding of fields, habitus, practices, and the various forms of 
capital employed in social phenomena therefore provides a more powerful theoretical 
understanding of social class than constructing “simple countable populations” or 
“aggregating the individual classifications” (Bourdieu 1984: 483). This is because 
Bourdieu’s theory allows us to understand the actual mechanisms of class reproduction. 
Much like E.P. Thompson, Bourdieu argues that “a class is defined as much by its 
being-perceived as by its being” (Bourdieu 1984: 483). However, Bourdieu offers us a 
profound new theory that re-incorporates the material aspects of social class in the 
conceptual form of fields and practices. This allows us to understand and appreciate the 
relationship between subjective and objective social phenomena.  
Doing so is meant to emphasize “the relative autonomy of the logic of symbolic 
representations with respect to the material determinants of socio-economic condition” 
(Bourdieu 1984: 483). This is a fancy way of saying that culture is arbitrary, and that we 
are deliberately being programmed to perceive concrete material reality in a particular 
way—i.e., the bourgeoisie and upper classes maintain hegemony through effective social 
institutions, which shape our perceptions. Within “the individual or collective 
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classification struggles aimed at transforming the categories of perception and 
appreciation of the social world” the social world itself becomes “a forgotten dimension 
of the class struggle” (Bourdieu 1984: 483). Merely recognizing this fact, however, 
exposes the arbitrary nature of social reality, and the power relations underlying the 
assumptions of everyday life, thereby essentially freeing our minds from cultural 
domination. Put simply, Bourdieu is hoping we will all notice the elephant in the room, 
and become liberated through a theoretical understanding of social phenomena; this is 
much more instrumental than simply providing society with quantitative models of social 
stratification. 
Synthesizing Marx with contemporary theories, Bourdieu arguably presents 
professional sociology with a superior theoretical framework for researching stratification 
and social class. Bourdieu's fields allow us to re-incorporate geographic analyses—
environmental sociology, material culture, effects of technology, etc.—back into our 
research. The concept of habitus allows us to study how class is reproduced through an 
embodied culture, i.e. culture that is not abstract or free-floating in some abstract ether, 
but a pre-programmed culture that is, at the same time, strategically adapted by the agent-
subject. Studying practice allows sociology to recognize a particular class as a category 
of actual economic behaviors that occur within and through social structures, which I 
would argue ought to be the defining feature of a social class. Finally, Bourdieuian 
capital allows us to analyze the resources that 1) maintain and reproduce power relations, 
2) promote domination, and 3) catalyze social mobility. In summary, we have a 
comprehensive theory of class as it is being produced and re-produced: 
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social causes of class (fields, habitus, capital)-->practice (class itself)-->effects 
(social location, individual attributes, characteristics, values, and attitudes, etc.) 
 
 
effects (social location, individual attributes, characteristics, values, and attitudes, etc.) 
-->practice (class itself)-->social causes of class (fields, habitus, capital) 
 
 
 
More importantly, Bourdieu also falls in line with E.P. Thompson's overall 
project of recognizing the existential reality of social class relations. The main problem 
throughout the history of American sociology is that, owing to a lack of substance, 
theoretical deficiencies, and methodological fetishism, professional sociology has more 
often than not confused the effects of class with class itself; more importantly, driven by 
ideology, location, and institutional effects, I have demonstrated that professional 
sociologists are also prone to avoid the causes of class. Put simply, our quantitative 
treatments of class, focusing on merely discovering statistical correlations between 
concepts, tend to limit the study of stratification to the assumed relationships between 
social location, lifestyle or culture, and other individualistic attributes. This approach not 
only fails to understand what class is—real, lived, economic behavior in a material world 
that produces a collective experience—but also fails to understand (theoretically) the 
actual causes and mechanisms of class. Seen in this way, research that merely draws 
correlations between the effects of class (e.g., wealth and income, education, and 
prestige) is clearly redundant, since economic practices that share a similar social 
location or organic function, and employ the same set of strategic capital, are of course 
going to manifest similar statistical outcomes.  
However, Bourdieu's greatest limitation is that he often borderlines on French 
idealism, limits himself to cultural anthropology and tends to avoid alternative methods 
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of analysis. Bourdieu hastily rejects structuralism and structural Marxism (Ritzer 2008: 
403). The task of future researchers will be to use Bourdieu's theory to construct better 
'maps' of society, using it to analyze class more categorically, to apply it to particular 
societies, and to adapt it to the various qualitative and quantitative methods—not so much 
as the way in which Wright attempts to adapt Marx into a bourgeois paradigm, but 
instead to expand on Bourdieu’s theories in a similar spirit of resistance. 
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DISCUSSION 
 Employing a sociology of knowledge, a critical literature review of the theories 
and concepts used to study social class throughout the history of American sociology 
reveals that ideology, social location, and social institutions have had negative effects on 
those researchers attempting to understand and explain social stratification. These effects 
need to be recognized and acknowledged so that they might be dealt with in future 
research, thereby allowing researchers to overcome their own limitations and hopefully 
conduct research that is more objective and instrumental. 
 Sociologists are obviously not, nor have they ever been, 'value-free.' Those 
sociologists who claim to be 'value-free' are frankly delusional or worse—attempting to 
mislead their audiences by using the illusion of objectivity as a rhetorical strategy. It 
would seemingly be much better for the individual researcher, the reader, the discipline, 
and the population being studied if the researcher would simply adopt benevolent values 
that favor the population and make them explicit, e.g. what Mills refers to as an adequate 
philosophy. 
Many scholars are quick to claim that ‘class’ is an outdated concept. Nearly two 
decades ago, Pakulski & Waters argued that there is a “declining commitment to 
Marxism” and a “waning appeal of socialist ideologies” in the Western world, so “both 
the left and right are abandoning their preoccupation with class issue” (1996: 1). They 
denounced class-based theories of stratification altogether and caricature the project of 
‘class-analysis’ as irrelevant and outdated (Pakulski & Waters 1996: 3). They claimed 
that the idea of class itself was simply going to fade away into the dustbin of history. Of 
course, it has not. The issue of social class has not gone away; if anything, it has become 
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more relevant, more important. My project is a testament to the fact that, despite the 
many bourgeois sociologists proclaiming the death of class throughout American history, 
the experiences of social class, as an all-too-real-fact, keeps the idea discussion alive. As 
long as the lower classes are being exploited by a powerful upper class minority, the idea 
of class will persist, despite the apologetic claims of bourgeois academicians. 
 'Class' therefore needs to be re-introduced as a mainstream term and concept in 
our discussions of inequality. American sociology has deliberately avoided the issue of 
social class and attempted to replace it with other terms and concepts which are less 
threatening to the status quo. Unfortunately, these concepts fail to reflect important 
aspects of stratification, and ultimately leave sociology biased towards the upper classes. 
“Class” as a word arguably conveys important, instrumental meanings—inherent power 
relationships, historical context, common destiny, fraternity, agency, struggle, and, most 
importantly, hope. If sociology is to form an adequate philosophy, better understand 
stratification, and promote the interests of the public, it must stop avoiding the issue of 
social class. Furthermore, ‘class’ categories must not be framed in such a way that class 
relations are downplayed or distorted, e.g. using terms such as ‘working class’ to soften a 
lower class existence, presenting numerous categories to make society appear more 
stratified than it actually is, or hiding material and economic relations under a shroud of 
‘prestige.’ 
 Next, studying stratification cannot be limited to quantitative analysis. Good 
social theory is required, not only to construct and present accurate descriptions of 
stratification, but to understand the causes and effects of stratification. Because 
professional sociology has grown theoretically deficient, all too often the causes of social 
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class are confused with the effects, and vice versa. While quantitative analysis is certainly 
important, triangular approaches that incorporate historical analysis, qualitative methods, 
and critical theories must not be marginalized by the profession. A synthesis of 
interdisciplinary knowledge and methods is necessary to better understand the 
phenomenon of social stratification. 
One cannot simply rely on common perceptions of class to describe stratification 
because hegemony ensures that common perceptions are skewed to maintain the status 
quo, e.g. the lower classes are often deceived to believe that they are middle class 
workers, just as the middle classes are frequently duped into adopting bourgeois 
aspirations and a belief in unfettered meritocracy, also known as the ‘American dream.’ 
Therefore, class-consciousness can often be a poor indicator of class realities. 
Stratification is ultimately structural, i.e. classes are primarily caused by objective 
economic factors, so that in order to truly understand social class one must transcend 
subjective indicators. Researchers studying stratification and social class should attempt 
to construct 'maps' of society in order to showcase the structural relationships between 
groups.  
 One limitation of this project is that I have mainly focused on mainstream 
sociological theories and concepts of class. There are other important aspects of 
stratification that I have reluctantly had to omit, including politics, race, gender, and 
immigration. Unfortunately, much like social class, these topics often become the 
elephant in the room, and have historically been avoided, marginalized, or distorted by 
professional sociologists.  
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 Understanding race is crucial to class-based theories because the division of labor, 
including “the labor process, work spaces, intra-class power relations, communities and 
neighborhoods—indeed, the class struggle itself” have been “racialized” (Kelley 1994: 
26). This phenomenon is not limited to black America or ethnic minorities, but also 
implies a highly-racialized “white working-class consciousness” (Kelley 1994: 30). 
Furthermore, throughout the history of the United States, the “struggles for dignity and 
autonomy often took on an intraclass character” (Kelley 1994: 29-30). For example, 
black men and women, who technically inhabit the same class as white workers, have had 
to deal with racial discrimination and degradation offered by the white people who share 
their social location. 
 Racial relations often mirror the power relations between upper and lower classes. 
Royster (2003: 31) has shown that a “durable inequality” has persisted, despite the 
ideological claim that racism has disappeared and the American meritocracy prevails. 
“The earlier creation and contemporary maintenance of segregated networks and 
institutions,” writes Royster, “does the work of perpetuating racial inequality by making 
everyday exclusionary behaviors a path of least resistance for contemporary whites” 
(2003: 31). We may be through with the past, but the past is not through with us. Social 
networks produce a “structure inimical to outsiders, who fare poorly because job 
opportunities get withdrawn from the open market, and ethnic membership implicitly 
circumscribes eligibility for employment” (Waldinger & Lichter 2003: 98). Bonacich 
(1972: 548) refers to this phenomenon as an exclusion movement, based on ethnic 
antagonisms, aimed at maintaining the in-group’s social location. 
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The history of racial segregation in America has created conditions in which the 
easiest way to categorize people is by race and ethnicity. Contemporary research has 
indicated that “when employers are looking for the most 'appropriate' worker, suitability 
is largely determined categorically” (Waldinger & Lichter 2003: 8). Put simply, the way 
that a ‘type’ of worker is often identified by potential employers (e.g., stereotyped) is 
usually by race or ethnicity. In the context of capitalism, this establishes what is known 
as the “hiring queue,” defined as the ordering of job candidates by racial or ethnic groups 
(Waldinger & Lichter 2003: 8). Certain racial and ethnic categories are assumed by the 
bourgeoisie and their managers to have the ‘right’ skills and attitudes for various ‘bad 
jobs.’ Consequently, “stereotypes and prejudices are likely to matter, perhaps at the 
beginning of the hiring process in the small, family-run firm, perhaps at the end of the 
day in the large, professionally managed organization…the issue at hand involves the 
personal attributes that employers prefer” (Waldinger & Lichter 2003: 16). Immigrants 
especially are now seen as ideal candidates for these positions because of the relative 
poverty they are used to. The powerlessness of immigrants, and the possibility of using 
them for undesirable jobs and exercising considerable control over them, is exactly what 
makes those immigrants a distinct category—or “underclass”—within the overall labor 
supply (Sassen-Koob 1981: 77).  
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In sum, although race was initially invented to justify a brutal regime of 
slave labor that was profitable to Southern planters, race making has 
become a key process by which the United States continues to organize 
and understand labor and national belonging. Africans, Europeans, 
Mexicans, and Asians each came to be treated as less civilized, less moral, 
less self-restrained races only when they were recruited to the core of the 
U.S. capitalist labor force. Such race making depended and continues to 
rest upon occupational and residential segregation…Race making in turn 
facilitated the degradation of work itself, its organization as ‘unskilled,’ 
intensely driven, mass-production work. Race making is class making, just 
as class making is race making. (Brodkin 2000: 245) 
 
 
 Researchers therefore cannot ignore politics, race, gender, or immigration when 
trying to understand stratification and social class, especially in American society. 
Capitalism not only induces class-reproduction, but deliberately maintains ethnic 
inequalities through various state apparatuses, social networks, and a hiring queue to fill 
downgraded jobs with cheap labor. Consequently, one cannot hope to understand or 
explain stratification without acknowledging the complex relationships between 
capitalism, globalization, and social class.  
The formation of race, class, and gender identities begins to develop in childhood, 
long before an individual enters into the wage-labor force; therefore, in order to better 
understand the social processes through which ideology and class-consciousness develop, 
we must also go beyond a “workplace-centered understanding of class” and understand 
class as “a learned position” that is rooted in childhood, the family, the community, and 
the difficulties an individual faces in everyday life (Kelley 1994: 37). We must connect 
social class to social institutions.  
While some might be naïve enough to argue that professional sociology is just 
fine, polls show that around 90 percent of people in the United States, with salaries 
ranging as low as $7,000 and as high as $113,000, now identify themselves as “middle 
 
 
116 
 
class” (Mooney 2008: 20). This indicates that our society has an extremely limited 
theoretical understanding of stratification and social class. 
In conclusion, professional sociology has been corrupted by a conservative 
American ideology. The perspective of social researchers is often limited by their own 
social location, which more often than not offers them an ‘upper class’ view of society. 
Academic institutions, likewise corrupted by capitalism, also tend to reward intellectual 
work that either promotes bourgeois interests or does not threaten the status quo. 
Professional sociology in the United States is therefore failing the public, promoting a 
limited understanding of stratification, and avoiding the issue of social class. Class-based 
theories have been replaced by a methodological fetishism that lacks substance. It would 
probably be safe to assume that the workers in our society have a better understanding of 
the implications of class than many professional sociologists, because, unlike those who 
sit in the ivory tower, working men and women experience the effects of social class on a 
daily basis. 
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